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BREAKING THE CYCLE:
COUNTERING VOTER INITIATIVES
AND THE
UNDERREPRESENTATION OF
RACIAL MINORITIES IN THE
POLITICAL PROCESS
KRISTEN BARNES∗
ABSTRACT
This Article examines issues of inequality in education, minority
representation, and access to the political process. The Article considers
constitutional protections and other legal mechanisms available to racial
minorities to nullify or circumnavigate majoritarian voter initiatives that
seek to override federal constitutional guarantees and United States
Supreme Court holdings on the validity of the use of race in university
admissions decisions. Voter initiatives have been used to undermine the
socio-economic and political interests of vulnerable communities. In the
education realm, affirmative action opponents are increasingly adopting
this instrument to defeat race-conscious admissions policies. This Article
focuses on several seminal cases involving the political process doctrine,
including the Court’s most recent decision, Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action. In Schuette, the Court held that the
amendment to Michigan’s Constitution, which prohibits governmental
entities from utilizing race-conscious policies, is valid under the Equal
Protection Clause. In so holding, the Court failed to adequately address
the argument that the amendment leaves some minorities without
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meaningful access to the political process. This Article proposes
recommendations for ensuring that the rights of minorities are
adequately represented.
This case is not about how the debate about racial preferences
is resolved. It is about who may resolve it.1
– Justice Anthony Kennedy
Today’s decision eviscerates an important strand of our equal
protection jurisprudence. For members of historically marginalized
groups, which rely on the federal courts to protect their
constitutional rights, the decision can hardly bolster hope for a
vision of democracy that preserves for all the right to participate
meaningfully and equally in self-government.2
– Justice Sonia Sotomayor

INTRODUCTION
Education and voting rights are intricately linked. The ability of
racial minorities to influence matters of access to education is being
diluted in two prominent ways. The first is through voter initiatives. A
voter initiative is a political mechanism through which registered voters
may organize, obtain a requisite number of signatures on a petition, and
have that petition certified by the state for consideration by the general
electorate to change the state’s laws.3 In the education context, voter
initiatives and referenda have operated: (i) to render ineffectual
fundamental constitutional guarantees such as the right to vote and
have one’s vote count, as guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment and
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment, (ii) to distort legislation such as Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (iii) to circumnavigate court decisions that
validate constitutional protections and the use of protective strategies

1. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014).
2. Id. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
3. In contrast, the voter referendum typically operates by having “the legislature and
governor sign a bill into law and then, if enough citizens sign a petition to qualify a referendum,
the bill is sent to the voters for final approval.” See Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, The
Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative Government, in DANGEROUS
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 33, 41 (Larry J. Sabato,
Howard R. Ernst & Bruce Larson, eds., 2001).
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(e.g. affirmative action) intended to address disparities in education.4
Anti-affirmative action voter initiatives are operating to disadvantage
certain minorities precisely in the way that Justice Stone forewarned in
his famous Carolene Products Footnote Four5 and in ways that John
Hart Ely expounded upon in Democracy and Distrust, his influential
work on representative government and political process theory.6
Political science scholars have documented well the politically
disarming effects of the voter initiative on racial minority voters.7
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action8 exemplifies the
profound relationship between education and political participation in
policy decisions and, therefore, is a focal point of discussion.
This Article argues that not only should society as a whole be
concerned about the negative aspects of direct democracy mechanisms
but also courts, in particular, should be circumspect because their role
as effective adjudicators is being undermined. Courts are charged with
the responsibility of engaging in legally grounded and reasoned
analysis of matters involving the constitutional rights of citizens.
Abdicating their duties should not be a matter left to their sole
discretion. Yet this is exactly what is occurring.9 When confronted with
the opportunity to reassert their authority with respect to cases
involving the constitutional rights of racial minorities and matters of
equal education, the United States Supreme Court and some lower
courts have opted to eschew their responsibilities and anoint the
electorate, through the direct democracy vehicles of voter initiatives
and referenda, as the appropriate arbiter of constitutional rights.
Evidence of this disturbing trend is furnished by cases involving
plaintiffs who have brought challenges to anti-affirmative action laws.10
Schuette and the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Coalition for Economic

4. Derrick Bell, The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH L.
REV. 1 (1978); Barbara Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Vote, 1 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 41 (1997).
5. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
6. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (Harv. Univ. Press 1981).
7. See, e.g., Cain & Miller, supra note 3, at 33–62; Bell, supra note 4; Julian N. Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1545 (1990).
8. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
9. See id. at 1654 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur role as judges includes policing the
process of self-government and stepping in when necessary to secure the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection.”).
10. An anti-affirmative action law is one that counters race-conscious legal measures
designed to address present disparities in various realms (e.g. public education or employment)
or remediate past discriminatory treatment.
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Equity v. Wilson and Coalition for Economic Equity v. Brown11
exemplify this concerning trajectory of jurisprudence.
Anti-affirmative action cases are another avenue by which the
voting power of racial minorities in the realm of education is being
diluted. The impact of these cases is that racial minorities are
constrained in the contributions they are permitted to make in the
shaping of laws, policies, and practices that concern their access to
education and the quality of education they receive. White plaintiffs
typically initiate these cases involving equal protection challenges to
race-conscious college admissions policies.12 Problematically styled as
“reverse discrimination” cases, the plaintiffs assert that the policies
academic administrators have designed to decrease educational
disparities violate the Equal Protection Clause. As Reva Siegel has
astutely argued, the Supreme Court’s review of the anti-affirmative
action cases as compared to equal protection cases asserting that the
interests of racial minorities have been harmed demonstrates that
extraordinary constitutional protection is extended to the former while
the latter are subjected to the rigors of strict scrutiny and thus, likely to
be defeated.13 The downfall of race-conscious affirmative action
measures is that they announce themselves in terms of race.14 Escaping
that construct has proved to be challenging despite efforts to craft
substitute schemes that take into account race without expressly stating
that as a purpose.15 The Court’s approach to both types of cases is a
perverse application of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI, which
at their inception were crafted to address racial inequalities
experienced by certain racial minorities, particularly African
Americans.16

11. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (facial challenge)
(holding that section 31 did not violate the equal protection clause). The Ninth Circuit rejected
the argument that racial classifications were involved, thereby precluding the political structure
argument, because the face of the amendment prohibited racial discrimination. Id. at 702. See also
Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (reaffirming previous holding that
“section 31 under a political-structure equal protection analysis, did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
12. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. Reva Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013).
14. To the extent the policies state that they permit admissions committees to consider race,
this factor is a visible one. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
15. The percentage plans in Texas and California are examples of alternative approaches.
16. See generally SAMUEL LEITER & WILLIAM LEITER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND POLICY (SUNY Press 2002).
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While both of the foregoing counter affirmative action strategies
(i.e. judicial deference to majority rule by initiative and litigation
attacks on race-conscious policies) present substantial challenges to
those who are concerned with fulfilling equality education objectives
for racial minorities who historically have been underrepresented in
higher education, this Article is primarily concerned with the promise
of political process theory, the erosive aspects of voter initiatives, and
how the judicial and legislative branches should deal with direct
democracy instruments in racial equality in education and voting
matters.
The Schuette case connects the anti-affirmative action cases with
the discourse on equality in public policy decisionmaking. This Article
argues that when courts are confronted with issues involving the
education of historically marginalized racial minorities, the final
determination of those matters should not be left to voters. Relying
upon direct democracy leaves minorities vulnerable. Their voices will
be stifled and they will be subject to majoritarian interests that may
seriously undermine and constrain their socio-economic advancement.
Various machinations of the majority often work to impair the ability
of minorities to fully access fundamental resources in society (e.g.
education) that are necessary for their well-being, development, and
growth as human beings. Therefore, even when democracy is the
prevailing political structure and formal equality exists, it is necessary
to have mechanisms in place that are designed to protect racial
minorities. The government’s failure to facilitate their flourishing in this
way limits their potential to make valuable contributions, advance, and
ultimately impoverishes society as a whole.17 It is necessary to have
processes and institutions that achieve the goals of participatory
democracy and that interrogate the quality and impact of formal
equality. Judicial interrogation should be informed by the history that
gave rise to the guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and certain legislative interventions of Congress (e.g.
Title VI and the Voting Rights Act).
This Article proceeds in the following manner: Part I situates
Schuette within the education jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court, discusses the origins of political process theory,
17. Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, Separate and Unequal: How Higher Education
Reinforces the Intergenerational Reproduction of White Racial Privilege, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY CENTER ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE (July 31, 2013),
https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SeparateUnequal.FR_.pdf.
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provides background on the case, and critiques the Schuette decision.
In particular, this Article highlights Schuette’s inconsistencies and
errors regarding the political process theory.18 The Court articulated a
new but grossly insufficient standard for protecting equal rights, and for
facilitating their achievement for racial minorities who have been
historically disenfranchised and prevented from participating fully in
the benefits and privileges of American society. Moreover, the Court’s
treatment of political process theory as it pertains to matters of race
differs markedly from its receptiveness to the theory as it relates to
other groups, such as gays and lesbians, yet, the Schuette Court offered
no principled rationale for the inconsistent approaches.19 Part II
highlights some fundamental problems with voter initiatives that make
them particularly inappropriate to decide issues involving fundamental
constitutional guarantees. Part III makes recommendations. Part IV
concludes the Article.
I. SITUATING SCHUETTE
As an initial matter, it is necessary to situate Schuette in the context
of education jurisprudence. The importance of Schuette in relation to
the line of contemporary education legal jurisprudence20 has not been
adequately appreciated. Schuette squarely fits in this canon. Schuette is
about the avenues that historically disfavored racial minorities, such as
African Americans, have available to them to shape the educational
policies at public schools and to participate in an impactful way in
decisions governing access to higher education as compared to the
dominant population.
The litigants who brought the case at the lower level drew upon a
creative potent theory that the Supreme Court was familiar with in the
context of residential desegregation, school integration at the primary
and secondary levels, and sexual orientation and public
accommodations equality. The doctrine, known as the political process
theory, has its origins in Justice Stone’s Footnote Four in Carolene

18. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1623 (2014)
(misframing the issue); see also id. at 1638 (failing to apply strict scrutiny).
19. Compare id., with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
20. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
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Products21 and was further developed in the writings of John Hart Ely.22
Justice Stone’s footnote is particularly relevant to the appropriate
standard of review necessary to the evaluation of legal measures that
burden racial minorities. There, he raised the question of “whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”23
Political process theory is designed to address the deficits of a
democratic republic.24 In particular, the theory positions the judiciary
as a counterpoint to the will of the majority, which has the potential to
repeatedly frustrate the political representation of minorities.25 If the
political structure facilitates the constant muting of minority voices (i.e.
the expression of their political will), it has larger implications.26 Justice
Stone’s footnote recognizes that the political disempowerment of
minorities undermines democratic government. For those minorities
who often see their political interests consistently disregarded, their
faith in the political institutions purportedly dedicated to representing
them is likely to be shattered. Political process theory operates from the
premise that equality is not just a matter of being able to vote; it entails
being able to propose and effect political outcomes. The theory aims to
21. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
22. JOHN HART ELY, supra note 6. The Federalist Papers – in particular Federalist No. 10 –
provide additional historical grounding for the political process doctrine. THE FEDERALIST NO.
10 (James Madison). Federalist No. 10’s significance for political process theory is Madison’s
proposal that a representative republican government is the means to counter the influence of
factional interests. Id. Madison writes: “A republic, by which I mean a government in which the
scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which
we are seeking.” Id. The Supreme Court has developed or applied the theory in several cases. See,
e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist, No. 1, 458 U.S. 457
(1982); Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
23. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
24. Ely explains that in order to accomplish the goals of republican government to function
“in the interest of the whole people” it was necessary to develop a theory of representation “so
as to ensure not simply that the representative would not sever his interests from those of a
majority of his constituency but also that he would not sever a majority coalition’s interests from
those of various minorities.” ELY, supra note 6, at 82.
25. Id. at 77–88.
26. This discussion is not asserting that all individuals within a delimited minority think
alike. Rather, the point is that there are societal benefits, resources, and institutions to which
certain minorities do not have equal access. When these minorities attempt to act in unison or at
least as a cognizable group, the political structure fails to adequately take into account their
selections and critiques to make the appropriate reforms. Without a mechanism to intervene and
change that circumstance, the system remains structured in a way that perpetually disempowers
them.
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accomplish the notion of equality expressed in the Equal Protection
Clause.27 The essential aspects of the political process argument require
the court to apply strict scrutiny when the actions of a state work to
place the “‘decisionmaking authority over’” a legal measure or policy
at a removed level of government that “‘inures primarily to the benefit
of the minority’” and that minorities would view as being “‘in their
interest.’”28 A successful application of the theory by those that prevail
upon it means that, state laws that “disadvantage[] any particular group
by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf” may be
held constitutionally invalid.29
Lani Guinier posits that admissions decisions are “political as well
as educational acts.”30 Included in the realm of the political are: the
actions of weighing in on the decisionmaking processes and wielding
influence over the governing bodies that issue decisions about how
public academic institutions are structured; the criteria that determines
who is admitted; and the programs that are implemented to stimulate
the inclusion of diverse sectors of the population in the applicant pool.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the factors influencing the
political process and to consider whether the power to guide, affect, and
at times, determine the outcome of that process is evenly distributed or
whether the process is structured in a way that preserves the status quo.
Schuette presented this complex matter.
A. Born in a Firestorm
Schuette emerged from the actions of opponents seeking to
dismantle the groundbreaking racial equality gains of civil rights
activists in the areas of education and employment. In a carefully
crafted decision, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law
School’s admissions decisions practices allowing for a consideration of
race in a narrowly tailored way in Grutter.31 Anti-affirmative action

27. Ely comments that prior to the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause, the ideal of
“‘equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that
govern them’ . . . functioned as a component–even on occasion as a judicially enforceable
component[]—of the concept of representation that had been the core of our Constitution from
the beginning.” (citation omitted) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180
(1977)).
28. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist, No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982) (quoting Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
29. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393. See also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 468.
30. Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gate of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (2003).
31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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groups in Michigan and in other parts of the country were determined
to nullify the Court’s ruling. Building upon a strategy tested by special
interest groups in California,32 in 2004 a group led by conservative
businessman Wardell Connerly33 organized to secure the adoption of a
ballot amending Michigan’s Constitution.34 The amendment, originally
designated as Proposal 2, contained a provision prohibiting state
entities (e.g. public schools) from drawing upon race-conscious policies
in “public education, public employment, or public contracting . . . .”35
As adopted, the effect of the amendment prohibited affirmative action
in Michigan.36 Equally disturbing for proponents of affirmative action,
Proposal 2 organizers styled their amendment, which was aimed at
preserving the status quo, as the “Michigan Civil Rights
Amendment.”37 In so doing, they were attempting to appropriate the
civil rights legacy, but their efforts were geared towards undoing the
32. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving the battle
against the anti-affirmative action initiative, Prop 209).
33. Wardell Connerly is an African American businessman who has led several efforts in
California and Colorado to abolish affirmative action in the United States. Mr. Connerly
previously served on the University of California’s Board of Regents. See Dean E. Murphy, Top
Foe of Affirmative Action Leaves California Regents, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/21/us/top-foe-of-affirmative-action-leaves-californiaregents.html; Charlie Savage, Affirmative Action Foe Is Facing Allegations of Financial Misdeeds,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17. 2005, at A10. See also WARD CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: MY FIGHT
AGAINST RACIAL PREFERENCES (2000).
34. Karen W. Arenson, Ballot Measure Seen in Wake of Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/10/us/ballot-measure-seen-in-wake-of-court-ruling.html?
ref=topics. See also Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
35. The amendment added Section 26, Article I to the Michigan Constitution. It reads:
Affirmative action programs.
1. The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and
any other public college or university, community college, or school district shall
not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation
of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
2. The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
3. For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the
state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or community college,
school district, or other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or
within the State of Michigan not included in sub-section 1.
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
36. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014) (“Under
the terms of the amendment, race-based preferences cannot be part of the admissions process for
state universities”).
37. See Michigan Civil Rights Amendment, Proposal 2 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Civil_Rights_Amendment,_Proposal_2 (2006) (last accessed
Feb. 3, 2017).
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work of civil rights organizations that were dedicated to overcoming
the vestiges of slavery and securing equality for African Americans,
other racial minorities, and females. The Proposal 2 advocates even
referenced the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI as the legal
foundation for their initiative.38
Proposal 2 was highly controversial. The Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action Integration, and Immigrant Rights and Fight for
Equality By Any Means Necessary (“BAMN”) sued, alleging that the
amendment to Michigan’s Constitution was unconstitutional in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972.39 The district court concluded that in
order to strike down Proposal 2, BAMN needed to show that the raceconscious measures drawn upon by Michigan’s public colleges and
universities “were required to combat [de jure] racial discrimination or
prevent resegregation.”40 Because they failed to make this showing, the
district court found Proposal 2 constitutionally valid.41
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit took an entirely different approach.
Applying the political process doctrine,42 the Sixth Circuit held
unconstitutional the “provisions affecting Michigan’s public colleges
and universities.”43 BAMN alleged that for racial minorities44 who are
the focus of corrective race-conscious admissions policies and
practices45 enacted in their interest, Proposal 2 as applied to Michigan’s
public colleges and universities, “impermissibly restructure[d] the
38. Id.
39. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 932.
40. Id. at. 957. In so reasoning, the court sought to distinguish between affirmative action
programs that are “mandated by the obligation to cure past discrimination” and
antidiscrimination laws “intended to protect against discrimination.” Id. But, the court’s logic is
flawed in that it fails to acknowledge that affirmative action practices are appropriately
categorized as measures “intended to protect against discrimination.” Id. See also GIRARDEAU
SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 75 (2000). The district court’s mischaracterization of
affirmative action, serves as the central basis for its ruling.
41. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
42. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal.
By Any Means Necessary v. Regents of Univ. of Mich. (BAMN), 701 F.3d 466, 491 (6th Cir. 2012),
rev’d en banc sub nom., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
43. Id.
44. BAMN had previously identified in its district court pleadings three groups, African
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, as being directly impacted by Proposal 2. Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Class-Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at ¶3, Coal. to
Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 960 (No. 06–15024).
45. The term “corrective” refers to the actions that federal and state governments along
with their various agencies and civil rights groups deemed necessary to counter the historical
practices that gave rise to the inequities in education that prevail today.
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political process” concerning school administrative matters thereby
denying them equal access to the political process in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.46
Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the
amendment to Michigan’s constitution was constitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause.47 An exploration of how the Court arrived at
its decision is necessary for highlighting what is at stake politically for
historically marginalized racial minorities, and for exposing the
inequitable and dangerous destabilizing risks that voter initiatives pose
to substantive equality and fundamental constitutional guarantees.
All these maneuvers undermine representative government and
pave the way for direct democracy to rule, which leaves the political
interests of certain racial minorities imperiled. In failing to subject the
Proposal 2 voter initiative to strict scrutiny, the Court permitted the
populist mechanism48 to replace the representative structure of
republican government with its built in checks and balances.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s words alarmingly invited the
supplanting of this structure. That is, in characterizing Michigan’s
adoption of the voter initiative as properly “bypassing public officials”
who were not acting in accordance with the wishes of the majority and
in declaring that the Constitution and the Court’s precedents furnished
no legal grounding for “the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that
commit this policy determination to the voters,” the Court favored the
populist process over one of reasoned judicial intervention and
protection.49
When the Schuette Court referenced the events leading up to
Michigan’s adoption of Proposal 2, it characterized the process as “a
46. BAMN, 701 F.3d at 473.
47. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1623.
48. Cain and Miller argue that populist strands eventually overtook progressive elements
and co-opted the voter initiative. They maintain that current use of the initiative departs from the
progressives’ initial conception of it “as an occasional ‘safety valve’ to make representative
government more responsive and effective.” Cain & Miller, supra note 3, at 59.
49. This Article agrees with Ely’s conclusion that the failure of the judiciary to act in this
countermajoritarian way constitutes a breakdown in the democratic structure as conceptualized
by the founders. The resulting dysfunction harms racial minorities. Ely writes:
[E]ven before the enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court was
prepared at least under certain conditions to protect the interests of minorities that
were not literally voteless by constitutionally tying their interests to those of groups
that did possess political power – and, what is the same thing, by intervening to protect
such interests when it appeared that such a guarantee of ‘virtual representation’ was not
being provided.
ELY, supra note 6, at 84–85.
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statewide debate on the question of racial preferences” and their
consideration by state entities.50 The use of the phrase “statewide
debate” suggests that several events significant to the democratic
process occurred. It suggests that the organizers or the state adequately
disseminated informative accurate information regarding the ballot
initiative. It conjures up the idea of state residents being invited to
participate in numerous hearings concerning the initiative and that the
proponents were available to answer questions regarding its purpose
and design. It leads the reader to believe that opponents of the ballot
initiative were able to participate in the hearings and present their
assessment of the proposal, and that the state legislators were given an
opportunity to explain how the proposal conflicted with or facilitated
existing state laws.
Yet this was far from the truth. In contrast to the foregoing idealistic
vision, Proposal 2’s saga was marked by deception, voter fraud, and a
breakdown in the systems of state governance that are entrusted with
protecting the rights of all its residents.51 This second tale of Schuette
concerns the struggle of civil rights groups and pro-affirmative action
supporters against the initiative in Michigan. Their battle unfolded in
the context of community organizing and in the courts. Their enormous
efforts demonstrate why it is not enough to propose reforming
initiatives as a solution to the dangers they pose to minority rights
issues. The saga demonstrates that in Michigan, and likely in other
states as well, inadequate procedures are in place to ensure the integrity
of the voting process.52
Over a period of six months, Ward Connerly’s group, the Michigan
Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”) collected signatures for its antiaffirmative action petition so that it could be placed on the November
2006 general election ballot.53 From the beginning, serious issues

50. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
51. Operation King’s Dream v. Connerly (OKD), No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 at *3 4
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) (discussing the history of Proposal 2).
52. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVES AND REFERENDUM
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL I&R TASK
FORCE (July 2002) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
53. OKD, 2006 WL 2514115 at *2. The procedures for Michigan’s initiative process are
contained in Article XII, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution. MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2. See
MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT REGARDING THE USE OF FRAUD AND
DECEPTION IN THE COLLECTION OF SIGNATURES FOR THE MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS BALLOT
PETITION
1
(June
7,
2006),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/PetitionFraudreport_162009_7.pdf
[hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT]. See also Arenson, supra note 34.
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plagued Proposal 2 concerning the conduct of MCRI’s signature
gatherers,54 the wording of the petition, and the validity of the
signatures obtained.55 As a result, residents filed multiple complaints
with several state agencies, including the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission (the “Commission”). The Commission, acting under the
powers granted to it in the state constitution, spent five months
investigating the chief complaints that: (i) MCRI’s proposal was
misleading in that it used the words “discrimination” or “preferential
treatment” instead of the phrase “affirmative action,”56 and (ii) the
signature gatherers falsely represented that the purpose of the petition
was to support affirmative action rather than ban it.57 After holding a
series of public hearings in which citizens testified, the Commission
issued a scathing report containing numerous findings and
recommendations.58 One essential finding was that MCRI engaged in
several “misleading and false” practices that required the Attorney
General’s attention and that of the Michigan Supreme Court in order
to properly remediate the harm to the civil rights of Michigan’s
electorate.59
While the Commission conducted its investigation, a non-profit
civil rights group, Operation King’s Dream (“OKD”), and BAMN filed
several unsuccessful state court actions.60 Their attempts to stop the
certification of MCRI’s petition were finally thwarted at the state court
54. In preparation for his campaign for Proposal 2, Connerly revealed that he planned to
hire a separate firm to obtain the necessary signatures and that he intended to pay them an
estimated “$1.50 a signature, or about $725,000.” Arenson, supra note 34. Connerly did in fact
hire an independent signature gathering firm. See OKD, 2006 WL 2514115 at *9.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *4. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53. The controversial petition
language reads in relevant part:
A Proposal to amend the Michigan Constitution by adding a Section 25 to Article I that
would: (1) prohibit the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State
University, and any other public college or university, community college, or school
district from discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting; (2) prohibit the State from
discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting.
OKD, 2006 WL 2514115 at *19 n.2.
57. Id. at *4.
58. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53.
59. Id. at 12–13.
60. On its website, BAMN describes itself as “a primarily student–and youth-based
organization of leaders in our schools and communities, committed to making real the promises
of American democracy and equality.” See BAMN, http://www.bamn.com/about-bamn (last
visited Jan. 2, 2017).

BARNES FINAL WORD (DO NOT DELETE)

136

2/6/2017 11:35 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:2

level when Michigan’s Supreme Court declined to review the
Commission’s report and held that the relevant inquiry regarding the
petition was limited to whether the board of canvassers acted within its
limited scope of authority to verify that the required number of
signatures had been obtained and to certify the petition on that basis.61
After making that determination, the court concluded it was not
empowered to examine the specific actions and representations of the
signature gatherers.62 The court reasoned that it was not appropriate
for it to decide, “what constitutes a ‘fair’ representation concerning
matters of political dispute” but rather those determinations should be
left up to the voters.63 Even though the stakes were high because of the
initiative’s potential impact on the federal constitutional rights of
disfavored racial minorities to meaningfully participate in the political
structure concerning educational policies that pertain to them, the
court opted not to act. Instead, it severely circumscribed the contours
of its duty. As a result, no probing evaluation of Michigan’s initiative
process occurred at the state court level.
Undeterred, in 2006 OKD filed a case against the state and MCRI
in federal court alleging that MCRI had committed voter fraud in
violation of the Voting Rights Act by engaging in several misleading
practices that resulted in MCRI improperly obtaining signatures in
support of its petition.64 Two striking aspects of the OKD case
demonstrate the real threat that voter initiatives pose to constitutional
rights and to the structure of the legal system, which is dependent upon
the counterweighting actions of its various branches to ensure that hard
won protections and rights are safeguarded.65 First, although the district
court judge made findings66 that recognized MCRI engaged in a
61. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 716 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2006).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. OKD, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006). Specifically,
the plaintiffs alleged that: (i) MCRI directed its voter fraud practices towards certain communities
based upon their race thereby denying them equal access to the political process; (ii) the petition
did not clearly state that the purpose of the measure was to abolish the use of affirmative action
by public schools and other entities in the state of Michigan but rather used phrases such as
“preferential treatment,” and “discriminating against”; and (iii) MCRI obtained a substantial
number of signatures through their fraudulent practices. Id. at *1, *2, *19. There was evidence
that approximately “125,000 signatures” of minorities were obtained in support of the petition, as
a result of the fraudulent practices. Id. at *2.
65. Id.
66. The findings, inter alia, included: 1) “MCRI and its circulators engaged in a pattern of
voter fraud by deceiving voters into believing that the petition supported affirmative action”; 2)
“The conduct of the petitioners went beyond mere ‘puffery’ and was in fact fraudulent because it
objectively misrepresented the purpose of the petition”; 3) “The MCRI defendants were aware
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“pattern of voter fraud,” the court nonetheless concluded that no
Michigan law prohibited signature gatherers from lying to individuals
regarding the substance and purpose of the voter initiative petition
being circulated.67 Second, the judge ruled that the petition was subject
to Section 2 of Voting Rights Act.68 But rather than this resulting in a
win for OKD, the court reasoned that because MCRI subjected all the
petition signers to the same fraudulent practices, a Section 2 violation
could not be established.69 Despite the outcome, OKD’s framing of
their issue in this way was useful because it invoked the history of
discrimination in voting and it required the court to revisit the purposes
of the Act. 70 Raising a Section 2 claim reminds courts that racial
discrimination in voting may manifest itself in innumerable ways.71
Therefore, courts must be vigilant in ferreting them out.72 The exercise
of judicial review illuminates places where there may be gaps between
statutory voting laws, designed to achieve substantive equality in
political representation and in equalizing the potency of the votes of
racial minorities who are relegated to the periphery of political
discourse, and current practices of discrimination.73

of and encouraged such deception by disguising their proposal as a ban on “preferences” and
“discrimination,” without ever fulfilling their responsibility to forthrightly clarify what these
terms were supposed to mean”; and 4) Jennifer Gratz’s testimony was “evasive and misleading
[and] [h]er denial of an invitation to participate in the [Commission’s] investigation was not
credible in light of the Commission’s detailed and thorough report.” See id. at *11, *19.
67. Judge Tarnow summarized the testimony of State Director of Elections Christopher
Thomas regarding the legality of making misrepresentations to individuals being solicited for
their signatures on voter-initiative petitions: “[Thomas] also testified that there is no provision of
state law addressing statements made by circulators of initiative petitions to potential signers . . .
. Thomas testified that to his knowledge it is not a crime under Michigan law to misrepresent the
purpose of an initiative petition.” Id. at *8. The court also found the evidence furnished by
Michigan’s Secretary of State that fifty signatures out of a random sample of 500 were invalid. Id.
at *2.
68. Id. at *14.
69. Id. at *17. The court further noted, “The Court finds it distressing that its finding of a
lack of discrimination is based on the fact that minority and non-minority voters had equal access
to a deceptive political process.” See id. at *19.
70. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2615 (2013) (Section 2 is intended to “to address
entrenched racial discrimination in voting.”).
71. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1651–79 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
72. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1381 (1964) (“any alleged infringement of the right to
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”). See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
645 (1993).
73. This Article shares Bertrall Ross’s view that the Voting Rights Act, “rather than simply
being seen as a vehicle that is enforcing a constitutional antidiscrimination requirement, should
also be seen as one enforcing the constitutional principle of representative equality.” See Bertrall
L. Ross, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent
Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 166 (2012).
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The OKD case highlights the lack of responsiveness of judicial,
administrative, and local systems to address serious infringements that
voter initiatives inflict on constitutional equality principles and civil
rights.74 If no level of government will acknowledge their duties, it
leaves racial minorities who are seeking to defend their constitutional
rights in a precarious state.
B. Critique of the Schuette Decision
One plausible interpretation of the Schuette decision is to view it as
the product of a simplistic yet challenging syllogism: Affirmative action
is not an express constitutional right; it is a privilege that state entities
can extend under certain circumstances.75 Because it is a privilege and
not a right, the state can prohibit its use.76 Relying upon a “democratic
process” like an initiative to deny a privilege is not unconstitutional.77
The University of Michigan was not required to use affirmative action;
it was permitted to do so.78 If Michigan’s public academic institutions
elect not to incorporate affirmative action policies into their admissions
decisions, this is not unconstitutional. Public colleges and universities
are subject to state policy. State policy may be decided by popular
vote.79 Therefore, the decision regarding whether state institutions may
utilize affirmative action may be determined by popular vote without
infringing upon the constitution.80 Casting the decision in this
favorable light grounds Schuette in democratic principles and frames it
in terms of objective standards.
The syllogism is deficient in that it fails to acknowledge that one of
the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause is to allocate
decisionmaking responsibility to the Court over matters concerning
race. Where racial classifications are involved and a challenge is

74. OKD, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) (“With the
exception of Michigan’s Civil Rights Commission, the record shows that the state has
demonstrated an almost complete institutional indifference to the credible allegations of voter
fraud raised by the Plaintiffs.”).
75. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629–32.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1636.
78. Id. at 1629–32.
79. Regarding the voters’ adoption of race-based policies or the prohibition of them in
school decisions, the Schuette Court concluded, “[t]he holding in the instant case is simply that
the courts may not disempower the voters from choosing which path to follow.” Id. at 1635.
80. See id. at 1636 (“By approving Proposal 2 and thereby adding §26 to their State
Constitution, the Michigan voters exercised their privilege to enact laws as a basic exercise of
their democratic power.”).
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brought, it is the Court’s responsibility to act.81 In other words, the
Court not only must decide who gets to decide policy matters involving
race, but also it must evaluate whether the laws and policies that
implicate race are constitutionally permissible. Here, even if one
accepts that the Court properly determined that it was constitutionally
valid for Michigan to subject the question of race-conscious admissions
to the electorate, it failed to fulfill its other responsibility to evaluate
whether the legal measure was also consistent with the constitution. In
order to perform that analysis, the Court needed to examine its effects.
Even though the process may be constitutionally valid, the product of
that process may not be. The following sections address the omissions
of the Schuette Court in more detail.
1. Inadequate Framing of the Issues
Justice Kennedy framed the question in Schuette in terms of the
democratic process:
[W]hether and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to
prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in governmental
decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.82

In posing this question, the Court was making certain assumptions
about how democracy operates in the United States. The Court
presumed that the political process unfolds with fairness and without
the cloud of voter fraud. There was a presumption about intellectual,
learned, rationale debate occurring amongst voters, and the suggestion
that the votes were cast only after the issues had been thoroughly
vetted and every interested party had an opportunity to express their
opinions and present them in a public forum.83 The Court’s vision
81. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (“[T]he core of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official distinctions based on race.”).
82. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623. Justice Kennedy’s framing of the question is strikingly different
from that of the Sixth Circuit, which concluded that:
[T]he sole issue before us is whether Proposal 2 runs afoul of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection by removing the power of university officials to even
consider using race as a factor in admissions decisions — something they are specifically
allowed to do under Grutter.
BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, 473 (6th Cir. 2012).
83. Justice Kennedy writes:
Here Michigan voters acted in concert and statewide to seek a consensus and adopt a
policy on a difficult subject against a historical background of race in America that has
been a source of tragedy and persisting injustices . . . Were the Court to rule that the
question addressed by Michigan voters is too sensitive or complex to be within the grasp
of the electorate . . . or that these matters are so arcane that the electorate’s power must
be limited because the people cannot prudently exercise that power even after a full
debate, that holding be an unprecedented restriction on the exercise of a fundamental
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further assumed a constitutional competency level amongst voters
enabling them to make decisions regarding fundamental constitutional
guarantees. This is a woefully inaccurate picture of what often occurs in
initiative campaigns.84 Moreover, as this Article highlights, the
Michigan Amendment was not the result of a fully participatory
process in which an informed and engaged electorate succeeded in
having the initiative included on the general election ballot for
consideration by Michigan voters, but rather the product of fraud and
deception.85 A fully participatory process must fulfill certain requisites
related to the substance (i.e. the impact of one’s vote on election
outcomes) and procedures of voting.86 Regarding procedure, the
government must ensure that comprehensive and accurate information
is provided to the citizenry.87 The electorate must have extensive access
to polling places.88 There must not be unreasonable time, place, or
eligibility restrictions.89 Regarding substance, states and the federal
government must take care to ensure that the political system is not
structured in a way that chronically discounts the effect of the political
choices of racial minorities.90
The Schuette Court’s query also ignored how the status of being a
disfavored racial minority is politically disadvantaging in a way that is
difficult (if not impossible) to overcome. The question failed to
appreciate the necessity for the safeguards within our political system
and the need for judicial intervention when certain constitutional rights
right held not just by one person but by all in common.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637.
84. See Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1730, 1745 (2013). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52.
85. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53.
86. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560–61 (1964) (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 18 (1964)) (“Wesberry clearly established that the fundamental principle of representative
government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without
regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State”).
87. As the Court concluded in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442 (1992), “the right to
vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the
integrity of the democratic system.” Providing reliable information so that voters can make
informed choices is essential to the proper functioning of democracy. See James A. Gardner,
Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 892, 897 (citations omitted) (“[A]ccurate issue voting depends upon [the voter
having] accurate relevant information.”).
88. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 (1966).
89. Id. at 656.
90. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 347 (1960) (“In no case involving
unequal weight in voting distribution that has come before the Court did the decision sanction a
differentiation on racial lines whereby approval was given to unequivocal withdrawal of the vote
solely from colored citizens.”).
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and issues of equality are at stake.91 A more complex question that
would have fully accounted for BAMN’s arguments is: Do states violate
the Equal Protection Clause when voters amend their state
constitution to: 1) deny racial minorities a voice in the process that
determines whether or not they have equal access to education; and 2)
target racial minorities by prohibiting a policy that is designed to secure
their equal protection rights? This question would have required the
Court to apply strict scrutiny because it acknowledges that racial
classifications are involved.92
Reframing the Court’s inquiry in the way proposed would be in
keeping with precedent.93 Voters are unlikely to evaluate initiatives
from the vantage point of whether they are consistent with
constitutional guarantees.94 It is the responsibility of judges to
undertake this analysis to assess whether constitutional rights have
been adequately protected. This is their “special role.”95
Just as the Schuette Court inadequately cast the relevant question
for its consideration, it was incorrect in its conclusion that the “case is
not about the constitutionality . . . of race-conscious admissions policies
in higher education.”96 Proposal 2 threatened the Court’s holding in
Grutter. Grutter affirmed that higher education admissions committees
91. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651–1679 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
92. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
93. As the Court concluded in Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1:
The issue here, after all, is not whether Washington has the authority to intervene in
the affairs of the local school boards; it is, rather, whether the State has exercised that
authority in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
458 U.S. 457, 476 (1982).
94. Ilya Somin, in critiquing idealist views of “deliberative democracy” (i.e. the practice of
citizens substantially engaging in government through extensive debate over political policies and
laws) argues that, in general, American voters lack essential knowledge regarding political
institutions, the structure of government, and foundational documents such as the federal
constitution. See Ilya Somin, Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance, 22 CRITICAL REV.
253, 257–62 (2010). Somin concludes that even with increased education levels and improvements
in information accessibility through technology, voters are ill equipped to perform the tasks that
deliberative democracy expects of them. See id. at 261. Applying those insights to voter initiatives
supports the argument that voters lack the requisite political and constitutional literacy to decide
constitutional issues that implicate matters of racial equality. See id. at 262. See also THE
ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, NEW ANNENBERG STUDY ASKS: HOW WELL DO
AMERICANS UNDERSTAND THE CONSTITUTION? (2011), http://www.annenbergpublicpolicy
center.org/new-annenberg-survey-asks-how-well-do-americans-understand-the-constitution/
(last accessed Nov. 16, 2016).
95. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 486 (stating courts have a “special role in safeguarding
the interests of those groups ‘relegated to . . . position[s] of political powerlessness’”) (quoting
San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
96. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630.
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can consider race in their admissions decisions, as long as the
decisionmaking committees review candidate files in a holistic way.
Considering race as one factor among several, this practice does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment..97 Because Michigan’s
Amendment precludes the consideration of race, it impinges on the
viability of the Grutter holding.
2. The Schuette Court’s Encounter with the Political Process
Doctrine
a. Failure to Apply the Political Process Doctrine
Building upon the inadequate frame the Schuette Court established
for its decision, rather than applying the political process doctrine, the
Court devoted substantial energy towards demonstrating that the
theory did not apply.98 The political process theory requires a multi-part
analysis.99 It must be demonstrated that the legal measure: 1) “has a
racial focus targeting a policy or program that ‘inures primarily to the
benefit of the minority’”; and 2) “reallocates political power or
reorders the decision making process in a way that places special
burdens on a minority group’s ability to achieve its goals through that
process.”100 If these elements are satisfied, the challenged law is subject
to strict scrutiny.101 Strict scrutiny requires that the state demonstrate
that the challenged law serves a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly tailored.102
At the district court level, BAMN argued, because Proposal 2:
creat[ed] a political process that sets aside race, among other
categories, for consideration “at a new and remote level of
government,’ [it placed]‘a substantial and unique burden on racial
minorities.”103

97. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
98. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636 (“The instant case presents the question involved in Coral
and Wilson but not involved in Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle.”).
99. BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472
and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
100. Id. at 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472 (1982);
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (1969)).
101. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472, 474, 482 n.28.
102. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
103. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d
924, 934 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (quoting Cantrell Amend. Complaint at ¶¶57, 58; Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. at 470, 483).
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The political process BAMN was referring to was that of the public
universities and colleges. Specifically, these institutions have a
governance structure composed of the elected Board of Regents, or a
board of trustees, and of entities delegated by the boards to serve that
structure.104 The boards authorize the various schools (including the
faculties and administrators) within the system to design their own
admissions procedures and policies.105 This structure is common to
many American public higher education institutions.106 Prior to the
adoption of Proposal 2, individuals had access to influence the
decisionmaking of school administrations by petitioning or lobbying
the boards on numerous matters.107 In fact, supporters of the raceconscious policies successfully did exactly that.108 After Michigan’s
adoption of Proposal 2, individuals could continue to present proposals
and otherwise lobby the board with the prospect of influencing its
decisions for all matters except issues concerning race.
Because Proposal 2 amended Michigan’s constitution, the only
available means to those seeking to restore race-conscious admissions
policies in the state would be to secure the amendment’s repeal. The
monetary costs and political capital involved make the accomplishment
of this feat extremely unlikely.109 The procedure would require the
amendment’s opponents to organize voters, obtain enough signatures
to have their ballot certified and presented to the general electorate,
and then win a majority of the votes for its passage.110 If nothing else, it
is clear that minority groups, such as African Americans, who have
104. Id. at 935.
105. Id. at 935–36.
106. See MIDWESTERN HIGHER EDUCATION COMPACT, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AND HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE POLICY REPORT 2 (2013), http://www.
mhec.org/sites/mhec.org/files/20130516state-constitutional-provisions-highered-governance.pdf.
See also Colleges and Organizational Structure of Universities – Governing Boards, The President,
Faculty, Administration and Staff, Students, Future Prospects, http://education.state
university.com/pages/1859/Colleges-Universities-Organizational-Structure.html (last checked
Jan. 2, 2017).
107. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
108. Id. at 930, 936.
109. The Court in BAMN summarized the Michigan’s constitutional amendment process:
Just to place a proposed constitutional amendment repealing Proposal 2 on the ballot
would require either the support of two-thirds of both Michigan House of
Representatives and Senate, see Mich. Const. art XII, § 1, or the signatures of a number
of voters equivalent to at least ten percent of the number of votes cast for all candidates
for governor in the preceding general election. See id. art XII, § 2. Once on the ballot,
the proposed amendment must then earn the support of a majority of the voting
electorate to undo Proposal 2’s categorical ban. See id. art XII, §§ 1–2.
BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, 484 (6th Cir. 2012).
110. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
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historically been denied voting rights or have confronted significant
barriers in their attempts to exercise their rights111 and who may also
have relatively constrained monetary wealth112 are more burdened in
seeking to accomplish a constitutional amendment that directly
pertains to their interests concerning equal educational opportunities
than the majority white population. Regardless of whether it is an
economic and political reality that individuals are required to spend
money in order to achieve certain socio-economic or political
outcomes, the idea that individuals need to have enough wealth in
order to secure their constitutional rights is disturbing. The process is
unequal for racial minorities in a way it is not for other groups who may
choose to petition public universities to consider other factors, such as
athletic background, class status, or legacy ties.113 This is so because with
the adoption of Proposal 2, it is no longer within the purview of the
universities’ discretion to consider race.
b. Failure to Distinguish Political Process Theory Precedents
The Schuette Court concluded that political process theory didn’t
apply.114 In so ruling, it not only sought to distinguish the facts of
Schuette from the relevant precedents of Hunter v. Erickson115 and
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,116 but also attempted to
undermine the prior case law. Despite its efforts, the Court failed. The
Court’s approach and its inconsistent reception to the political process
doctrine in other contexts raise serious questions of judicial fairness
and contravene basic principles of representative government. As John
Hart Ely observed, representative government does not:

111. See Atiba R. Ellis, Race, Class, & Structural Discrimination: On Vulnerability Within the
Political Process, 28 J. OF C.R. & ECON. DEV. 33 (2015). See also SPANN, supra note 40, at 85–155.
112. The Pew Research Center reported in December 2014 that the “wealth of white
households was 13 times the median wealth of black households.” RAKEESH KOKCHHAR &
RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, WEALTH INEQUALITY REPORT (Dec. 14, 2015),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/.
113. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d
924, 936 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting that “[i]n response to Proposal 2’s passage, the universities
eliminated race from their admissions criteria but continued to consider various other
nonacademic factors, such as geography, alumni connections, socioeconomic status, and athletic
ability.”).
114. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637–38 (2014). (“For
reasons already discussed, Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle are not precedents that stand for the
conclusion that Michigan’s voters must be disempowered from acting.”).
115. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
116. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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Mean that groups that constitute minorities of the population can
never be treated less favorably than the rest, but it does preclude a
refusal to represent them,[] the denial to minorities of what
Professor Dworkin has called “equal concern and respect in the
design and administration of the political institutions that govern
them.”117

The Schuette decision evinces the Court’s failure to give due
attention to the racial minorities before them who were asserting their
interests and highlighting how those interests had been compromised
by direct democracy.
The Schuette Court structured its decision in terms of three cases,
Reitman v. Mulkey,118 Hunter, and Seattle. All three cases involved
voter-initiated amendments.119 All three measures were determined by
the United States Supreme Court to be unconstitutional in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.120 Schuette grouped together Reitman,
Hunter, and Seattle in support of the proposition that only where the
state can be viewed as engaging in the constitutionally impermissible
discriminatory action of “inflict[ing] injury by reason of race” (e.g. such
as enacting or enforcing laws that prohibit certain races from being
served in public restaurants)121 can the Court strike down the
challenged legal measure under the Fourteenth Amendment.122
The Court’s treatment of Reitman is flawed for several reasons. The
main issue is the difference in the type of case that Reitman presents as
compared to Schuette and its precedents. Reitman was not a political
process doctrine case.123 Reitman is not like Hunter and Seattle because

117. ELY, supra note 6, at 82 (footnotes omitted).
118. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
119. 387 U.S. at 370–71 (describing that the state constitutional amendment was “an initiated
measure submitted to the people as Proposition 14 in a statewide ballot in 1964”); see also Hunter,
393 U.S. at 386–89; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 462–63.
120. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at
487.
121. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375–81 (discussing cases involving equal protection violations).
122. In commenting on the three cases, the Schuette Court concluded:
Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle are . . . cases . . . in which the political restriction in
question was designed to be used, or was likely to be used, to encourage the infliction
of injury by reason of race.
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637–38 (2014).
123. It is also worth noting that the Hunter Court specifically distinguished Reitman, noting
that Reitman did not involve “an explicitly racial classification.” See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389
(“Here, unlike Reitman, there was an explicitly racial classification treating racial housing matters
differently from other racial and housing matters.”). While the Hunter Court’s description is
accurate given that the Reitman initiative did not reference race, the point has limited utility
because restricting the state from interfering with the “absolute discretion” of property owners in
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it does not involve political process theory and does not shed light on
how the theory is to be applied. In grouping the three cases, the Schuette
Court undercuts and subverts the precedential value of Hunter and
Seattle. Neither of the plaintiff-couples in the lower court cases related
to Reitman framed their arguments in terms of the political process
doctrine.124 This is significant because a complainant asserting a
political process argument must identify a political process that they
are either excluded from participating in or their access to the process
is significantly encumbered as compared to the politically or racially
dominant majority.125 Unlike Hunter which dealt with the process of
enacting fair housing legislation,126 or Seattle which dealt with the
process of public school boards for making decisions regarding policies
and procedures, or Schuette which dealt with the process of the boards
of public universities concerning their policies and the process of
adopting a state constitutional amendment, the plaintiff-respondents in
Reitman did not allege that they were excluded from a political process.
Instead, they asserted that the contested law was racially discriminatory
and contravened the antidiscrimination provisions of the California
Code.127 As discussed below, the Court analyzed the case and rendered
its decision based on the Equal Protection Clause.128 Reitman supports
the position that where the challenged law can be read as involving the
state government in “invidious” “private discriminations,” it must be
deemed violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and invalidated.129
Accordingly, the Reitman Court’s focus was not on the political process
doctrine but rather on identifying when the action or inaction of state
government may be said to constitute racial discrimination.130

their private real estate matters nonetheless implicates suspect classifications under the Federal
Constitution. Id. This effect would be apparent with the filing of individual lawsuits alleging that
landlords were engaging in racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by
failing to rent to people of certain races.
124. Reitman involved the consolidation of two cases. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 372. Both sets of
plaintiffs grounded their arguments in terms of anti-discrimination provisions of the California
Code. Id. On appeal, the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of the couples based upon the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 372–73.
125. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 485–87.
126. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389.
127. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 372–73.
128. See id. at 376 (“The judgment of the California court was that s 26 unconstitutionally
involves the state in racial discriminations and is therefore invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is no sound reason for rejecting this judgment.”).
129. Id. at 380–81.
130. The Reitman Court specifically declined to propose a test for making the determination
of when state action constitutes racial discrimination. Id. at 378. As to the facts of the case, the
Court concluded, “Here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing
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The Reitman initiative concerned the private right to discriminate
in real estate transactions. 131 California voters adopted the initiative,
known as Proposition 14, in 1964 in response to the state’s antidiscrimination statutes, which were aimed at, inter alia, securing racial
equality in housing.132 Proposition 14 prohibited the state from placing
restrictions on the discretion of individuals or private entities to choose
who to engage with in their private real estate exchanges.133 The
Reitman Court held that the challenged provision required the state to
become unconstitutionally enmeshed in racial discrimination.134
Relying upon this holding, the Schuette Court concluded that because
the same could not be said of Michigan’s Amendment, it did not run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.135 Here, the Court misapplied
Reitman and attempted to fashion a rule that does not encapsulate the
elements of the political process doctrine.
If Reitman is to be applied, the lessons that one may draw from the
case support invalidating Michigan’s Amendment, not upholding it as
the Schuette Court concluded. Regarding the matter of state
involvement, Michigan’s Amendment does implicate the state in
matters of racial discrimination. However, in Schuette the argument
pertains to the political process. This difference is significant.
Michigan’s adoption of the amendment alters the political process so
as to burden certain minorities (e.g. African Americans, Latinos, and
Native Americans), compared to the politically dominant white
majority population in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The
constitutional amendment operates in a way that harms racial
minorities who previously benefitted from race-conscious admissions
policies. By allowing this inequitable treatment, which is linked to race,
to persist, the state may be said to be condoning racial discrimination.
Another way that Reitman could be read to support the invalidation
of the Michigan Amendment is by adhering to the principle that the
law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does
authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market.” Id. at 380–81.
131. Reitman’s Proposition 14 provided in relevant part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or
rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to
such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion chooses.
Id. at 371.
132. Id. at 374.
133. Id. at 374–76.
134. Id. at 376.
135. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637–38 (2014).
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fact that voters generated the challenged measure does not alter the
Court’s duty to rigorously evaluate its impact on constitutional rights.136
Reitman supports the argument that more than deferential scrutiny is
warranted to determine how the state is operating when a voter
initiative is at issue and a claim of discrimination is brought.137
Reitman’s place in deciding cases involving voter initiatives supports
this paper’s argument that, such mechanisms should not be permitted
to automatically trump fundamental constitutional guarantees.
The next case that Schuette contends with is Hunter. Unlike
Reitman, Hunter is a political process theory case. Accordingly, the
Schuette Court needed to apply the conceptual approach of Hunter to
the facts in order to properly evaluate BAMN’s arguments.
In Hunter, voters in the City of Akron organized to counter an
ordinance adopted by the city council to address racially discriminatory
practices in Akron’s residential real estate market. Relying upon the
referendum mechanism,138 opponents of the fair housing ordinance,
after obtaining support from “[ten percent] of Akron’s voters,”139
successfully secured the inclusion of a proposed amendment to Akron’s
charter on the general election ballot. The charter amendment
effectively repealed the city council’s ordinance and reconfigured the
process for passing similar fair housing ordinances in the future by
requiring that a majority of the electorate approve them rather than
merely the city council.140
136. Reitman calls for a case-by-case assessment of when a state may be viewed as being
involved in private discriminatory action to a degree that constitutes the state’s endorsement or
commission of discrimination. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 378. While the Court did not identify the level
of scrutiny it applied to the Reitman initiative, it did reveal that like the California Supreme Court,
it was focusing on the “purpose, scope, and operative effect” of the initiative. Id. at 374. In this
respect, Reitman shares in common with Hunter, the conclusion that reliance upon direct
democracy vehicles to accomplish constitutional changes does not insulate the initiative from the
Court’s scrutiny as to whether it complies with the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1969).
137. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 378–79 (rejecting the notion that there is an invariable test to
determine impermissible state action in private discrimination).
138. Even though the mechanism is called a “referendum” in Hunter, it is not clear that the
process involved the initial input of the legislature before being referred to the voters, as is
typically the case. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390, 392 (concluding that the fact that the amendment
was established through a referendum does not protect it from judicial scrutiny).
139. Id. at 387.
140. The amendment to the city charter read:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the use,
sale, advertisement, transfer, listing agreement, lease, sublease or financing of real
property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin or ancestry must first by approved by a majority of the electors voting
on the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective.
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After a majority voted in favor of the amendment, Nellie Hunter,
an African American female, brought suit to compel Akron’s
Commission on Equal Opportunity in Housing and other city officials’
compliance with the fair housing ordinance.141 Hunter alleged that the
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause in that it subjected
individuals who sought protection against racial discrimination in
housing transactions to a more demanding process. The Court agreed,
reasoning that because the charter amendment instituted a different
more taxing process for matters involving “race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry”142 and real transactions, it “discriminates against
minorities, and constitutes a real, substantial, and invidious denial of
equal protection of the laws.”143 The differential treatment in
government matters contravenes the Equal Protection Clause in that,
“the State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making
it more difficult to meet legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person’s vote or give any group a smaller representation than another
of comparable size.”144
The Schuette Court distinguished Hunter by arguing that if the
latter upheld the charter amendment it would have meant that the state
was being compelled to commit or permit harm based upon race
because the adopted law would preclude it from intervening to stop
discrimination in real estate dealings.145 In contrast, the same could not
be said of the Schuette Court’s decision to uphold the Michigan
amendment because it has anti-discriminatory language in it. But given
that there was no de jure discrimination at issue in Hunter,146 the
emphasis on state action as a basis for distinguishing both cases is not
valid. Despite the Schuette Court’s efforts to differentiate them, the
amendments are facially similar.147 Neither amendment expresses an

Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the adoption of this section shall cease to be
effective until approved by the electors as provided herein.
Akron City Charter § 137.
141. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
142. Id. at 389 (“Only laws to end housing discrimination based on ‘race, color, religion,
national origin or ancestry’ must run s 137’s gauntlet.”).
143. Id. at 393.
144. Id. at 391–93.
145. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014) (concluding
that in Hunter “there was a demonstrated injury on the basis of race that, by reasons of state
encouragement or participation, became more aggravated.”).
146. The facts of Hunter recount that the city council implemented the fair housing ordinance
based “on a recognition of the social and economic losses to society” which are outgrowths of de
facto segregation. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386.
147. See Akron City Charter § 137; see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 371 (1967).
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intention to discriminate on the basis of race. In order to discern the
impact of both amendments, it is necessary to refer to the context.148
The political process doctrine requires the Court to focus on the harm
that the legal measure inflicts.149
The harm concerning the political process and racial minorities in
both cases is the same. Both Proposal 2 in Schuette and the charter
amendment in Hunter subject individuals to different processes. The
primary basis of separating individuals is by race. This is clear when one
considers the context of both amendments. The charter amendment
arose in response to the city’s adoption of anti-discriminatory housing
ordinances. The impetus for Michigan’s amendment was the Court’s
upholding of race-conscious admissions. While residential and school
integration can be viewed as goods accruing to society’s benefit as a
whole, disfavored racial minorities are the ones who would
immediately feel the harm of a real estate agent steering them away
from a neighborhood of their choice based upon race (even if the
reason is not made express by the agent). The same can be said of
academically underrepresented racial minorities in Michigan who will
experience the harm of not having the benefit of all the educational
opportunities that they would have otherwise enjoyed absent the
amendment. It is important to acknowledge that a central objective of
affirmative action is to counter the disadvantages that racial minorities
and females suffer as a result of persistent systemic, historical, and
societal inequities. The consequence of upholding both amendments
would be the same. There would be no immediately viable means for
redressing the harm caused. The harmed parties would need to seek
political change through the new process imposed.
Thus, where race is implicated, subjecting individuals seeking to
secure or enforce laws or policies devoted to racial equality in housing
and education to a different process from those individuals seeking to
shape housing and educational laws and policies in other respects,
without a compelling legitimate reason, constitutes a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. The decisive factor for the application of the
political process theory is the manner in which the voter mechanism is

148. In ruling, the Court referred to the ordinance that was nullified by the Hunter
amendment noting that, “[i]t is against this background that the referendum required by s 137
must be assessed.” Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
149. The Hunter Court underscored the importance of examining the effect of the law to
conclude that, “although the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical
manner, the reality is the law’s impact falls on the minority.” Id. at 391.
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operating. Just as the Hunter Court concluded that the referendum
must be struck down because it “disadvantages those who would
benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations
as against those who would bar other discriminations or who would
otherwise regulate the real estate market in their favor,”150 the same
logic would have applied in Schuette. With the enactment of Proposal
2, advocates of race-conscious university policies are treated differently
from advocates of other types of university policies.
The third case the Court distinguished, Seattle, also involved the
political process theory. Examining Seattle is not only relevant for its
guidance on the application of political process doctrine to voter
initiatives, but also for assessing the shortcomings of the Schuette
decision. At issue in Seattle was an initiative (“Initiative 350”) that
residents151 crafted in opposition to Seattle School District No. 1’s
(“Seattle District”) plan to desegregate its schools through a
compulsory busing scheme.152 Seattle District created the plan in
response to the hyper-segregation153 that pervaded the city’s
neighborhoods. Residential racial segregation throughout the city in
the 1960s until the 1980s contributed to extreme racial segregation in
the public schools. Busing seemed like an appropriate antidote.154
Initiative 350 mandated that:
[N]o school board . . . shall directly or indirectly require any student
to attend any school other than the school which is geographically
nearest or next nearest the student’s place of residence . . . and
which offers the course of study pursued by such student.155

Due to the numerous exceptions that Initiative 350 permitted under
the broad prohibition, the effect was to grant the school district
substantial latitude in assigning students for any reason so long as it
was not related to racial desegregation. Using the political process
150. Id. at 390–91.
151. The group who organized the ballot initiative designated themselves “Citizens for
Voluntary Integration Committee (CIVIC.)” See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457, 461–62 (1982).
152. Id.
153. See The Seattle Open Housing Campaign, 1959-1968, SEATTLE MUNICIPAL ARCHIVES
(Jan. 7, 2016, 3:45 PM), http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digitaldocument-libraries/the-seattle-open-housing-campaign (discussing housing segregation in
Seattle); see also, Kate Davis, Housing Segregation in Seattle (2005), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
zanran_storage/evans.washington.edu/ContentPages/1832317.pdf; see also UNIVERSITY OF
WASHINGTON,
SEATTLE
CIVIL
RIGHTS
AND
LABOR
HISTORY
PROJECT,
http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/segregated.htm.
154. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 460–61.
155. Wash. Rev. Code § 28.A26.010 (1981).
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theory, the Court held that the voter-initiated amendment, which
distinguished between the types of decisions within the school board’s
purview on a racial basis, violated the Equal Protection Clause.156
Justice Kennedy’s attempt to distinguish Schuette and Seattle failed
in several respects. Focusing on state involvement, Kennedy wrote,
“[t]he Seattle Court . . . found that the State’s disapproval of the school
board’s busing remedy was an aggravation of the very racial injury in
which the State itself was complicit.”157 But just as the state in Schuette
took a position in defense of the anti-affirmative action voter initiative,
the state in Seattle acted in defense of the anti-busing voter-initiative.
In terms of the effect, it is the same. Justice Kennedy’s de jure
distinction is of no consequence because this was not an issue in Seattle
or in Schuette. 158 In both instances the state acted counter to policies
that many historically disfavored racial minorities deemed to be in their
interest, as indicated by their state court challenges to the initiatives
and in their federal court constitutional challenges. The school district’s
busing policy was designed as a corrective to de facto not de jure
segregation. This is a point that the Schuette Court concedes.159 There
was no finding of state sanctioned segregation. The Seattle Court’s
concern regarding the initiative’s impact on de facto segregation was
made clear when it noted that with the adoption of Initiative 350,
“[t]hose favoring the elimination of de facto school segregation now
must seek relief from the state legislature, or from the statewide
electorate.”160
Affirmative action policies, as the executive office, courts, Congress,
and academic institutions originally conceptualized them, were aimed
at addressing inequalities that historically disfavored racial minorities
(e.g. African Americans, Native Americans, and Latino Americans) and
females experience.161 Numerous scholars have documented benefits of
the policies.162 Yet, as with any complex and challenging problem, it
156. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 487.
157. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (2014).
158. See id.
159. Id. at 1633. (relying upon an allegation made by the NAACP to argue that even though
there was no finding of de jure segregation by the Seattle Court, de jure segregation existed).
160. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 475.
161. See generally LEITER & LEITER, supra note 16 (providing a historical treatment of
affirmative action policies).
162. See CHRISTOPHER COTTON, BRENT R. HICKMAN & JOSEPH P. PRICE, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED FIELD
EXPERIMENT (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20397) (2014),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w2039; see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF
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takes time to counter the damage of discrimination. Racial minorities
continue to suffer inequities in education, employment, voting, and
healthcare.163 Therefore, laws that dismantle affirmative action policies
inflict, in the case of racial minorities, “injury by reason of race.”164 The
vociferous expressions of minority dissent to Proposal 2 and other antiaffirmative action measures lend support to this conclusion. Just
because the Schuette Court chose to ignore the likely consequences of
Michigan’s amendment and focus instead on another question (i.e. the
question of who gets to decide) does not change the probability based
upon impressive empirical data, that the numbers of African
Americans and other underrepresented racial minorities at selective
colleges and universities will decline.165
Next, the Schuette Court pointed to historical context to assert that
Seattle may be distinguished based upon the relatively noncontroversial
nature of busing, from the perspective of the State, as compared to the
controversy surrounding race-conscious admissions. The Court
maintained that, the constitutional validity of the remedy of school
busing wasn’t an issue presented by the parties or interrogated by the
Court166 in Seattle, whereas affirmative action remains highly
controversial. But the Court failed to give due attention to the fact that
in Seattle, the ballot initiative was motivated by some individuals who
questioned the appropriateness of the “remedy” of mandatory busing
just as in Schuette, the ballot initiative was motivated by some
individuals who questioned the “remedy” of incorporating raceRIVER (2000); Eric Grodsky & Michal Kurlaender, Mismatch and the Paternalistic
Justification for Selective College Admissions, SOC. OF EDUC. (May 2013),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0038040713500772 (countering Sander’s mismatch
arguments); Jamal Watson, Study Says Affirmative Action Does Not Do a Disservice to Students,
in DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. (July 1, 2013), http://diverseeducation.com/article/54320/#.
163. See Neil Irwin, Claire Cain Miller & Margot Sanger-Katz, America’s Racial Divide,
Charted, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1paArKg; see also KOKCHHAR & FRY, supra
note 112.
164. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014).
165. See Danny Yagan, Affirmative Action Bans and Black Admissions Outcomes: SelectionCorrected Estimates from UC Law Schools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
20361, 2014); see also Ford Fessenden & Josh Keller, How Minorities Have Fared in States with
TIMES
(Jun.
24,
2016),
Affirmative
Action
Bans,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/24/us/affirmative-action-bans.html?_r=0
(stating
that “[a] ban on affirmative action could lead to fewer minority admissions, as it has in some states
that have already outlawed it”).
166. The Schuette Court concludes, “[W]e must understand Seattle as Seattle understood
itself, as a case in which neither the State nor the United States ‘challenge[d] the propriety of
race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieving integration, even absent a finding
of prior de jure segregation.’” See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633 (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472 n.15 (1982)).
THE
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conscious elements into public college admissions decisions. Further,
the Schuette Court’s analysis ignores the fact that it already thoroughly
scrutinized and affirmed the legal and constitutional soundness of
academic institutions incorporating race-conscious factors into their
decisions in a holistic way in pursuit of diversity.167 Just as there were
dissenters to school busing in Seattle who registered their objections to
that remedy through the voter initiative, there were dissenters who
relied upon and voted for Proposal 2 in Michigan to register their
objections to affirmative action. The Schuette Court should have
accepted the “legitimacy and constitutionality of the remedy” (i.e.
affirmative action policies) targeted by the voter initiative because it
had previously decided this matter.168 This approach would be in
keeping with the State’s position that it was not asking the Court to
revisit the Grutter holding169 and with the Court’s representations that
its decision did not involve overruling Grutter.170
Another basis upon which the Schuette Court sought to distinguish
Seattle was the matter of racial classification. The Court’s attention to
this issue was necessary for two reasons. First, if the Court concluded
that Michigan’s law had a “racial focus” such that it “target[s] a policy
or program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority,’”171 this
would satisfy an essential element of the political process doctrine.172
Second, if Michigan’s amendment could be viewed as drawing upon the
concept of race to treat individuals differently, the Court would be
compelled to apply strict scrutiny in its evaluation of the law’s
constitutionality.173
A determination that race was involved in the operation of
Michigan’s law would have been favorable to BAMN. What the Court
did, instead, was express resistance to the notion of racial classifications
altogether. It maintained that in order to make the necessary
determinations regarding the effect of Michigan’s law, it would be

167. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
168. See id.
169. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623.
170. Id. at 1630 (stating the case “is not about the constitutionality, or merits, of raceconscious admissions policies in higher education . . . the Court [has] not disturb[ed] the principle
that the consideration of race in admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions are
met.”).
171. BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472;
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
172. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 474.
173. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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tasked with the unpleasant duty of having to racially classify people174
and to assess whether certain challenged policies were for the benefit
of particular racial minorities.175 The Schuette Court rejected Seattle’s
approach, reasoning that it would require judges to engage in the
loathsome practice of racial stereotyping.176 Because there were no
clear legal standards to assist in this endeavor, the Court maintained
that it could not conclude that the challenged legal measure implicated
race in a constitutionally impermissible manner.177
The Schuette Court’s racial stereotyping argument is not grounded
in sound reasoning. Political process theory does not require the
judiciary to classify individuals by race. It does, however, require the
courts to acknowledge that there are racial and ethnic identities that
individuals and groups have historically asserted and continue to do so,
and that American society acknowledges those identities. Race is
complex. The meaning of race and racial identities are sites of ongoing
contestation. Even though racial classifications are socially constructed
categories,178 they are social constructions that are infused throughout
American discourse and diurnal life. American society is already
racialized.179 It will take more than the Court’s refusal to recognize the
classifications to unravel this complicated social structuring of
existence.
The Seattle Court concluded, in deciding whether Washington’s
voter initiative had a racial component to it, “it is enough that

174. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634.
175. Id.
176. Id. (“It cannot be entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals of the same
race think alike. Yet that proposition would be a necessary beginning point were the Seattle
formulation to control.”).
177. Id.
178. Ian Haney Lopez offers a rich and complex definition of race:
[A]s a vast group of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially
significant elements of their morphology and/or ancestry. I argue that race must be
understood as a sui generis social phenomenon in which contested systems of meaning
serve as the connections between physical features, races, and personal characteristics.
In other words, social meanings connect our faces to our souls. Race is neither an
essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process
subject to the macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects of daily
decisions. As used in this Article, the referents of terms like Black, White, Asian, and
Latino are social groups, not genetically distinct branches of humankind
Ian Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, 29 HARV. C.R. –C.L. LAW REV. 6, 7 (1994).
179. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “racialization” as: “the act or process of
imbuing a person with a consciousness of race distinctions or of giving a racial character to
something or making it serve racial ends.” Racialization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY (2016), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/racialization.
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minorities may consider [the challenged law or practice] to be
‘legislation that is in their interest.’”180 In response to both questions
concerning the identity of the racial groups targeted and the immediate
intended beneficiaries, courts will have the benefit of the selfdeclarations of the litigants. Furthermore, regarding the latter inquiry,
courts have the benefit of the legislative history of the laws, empirical
data documenting how various racial groups perceive the legal measure
under scrutiny, and the arguments asserted by the groups. The concept
of “inur[ing] primarily to the benefit of the minority” is built into
affirmative action policies.181 Regardless of how racial minorities would
vote on an anti-affirmative action measure, it suffices that a challenge
to the measure is raised asserting that the political power of some racial
minorities is substantially impaired. If courts fail to thoroughly examine
this claim, they, in effect, are denying the group any proper relief. The
group’s representation within the democracy is diminished. The
Schuette Court’s rejection of the racial focus element of the political
process doctrine is tantamount to telling the BAMN plaintiffs, it does
not matter that you say you are African Americans, Latinos, and Native
Americans claiming that admissions policies which allow for
considerations of race under restricted circumstances operate in your
benefit. Because the Court cannot make that determination and has no
legal standards for doing so, your argument has no merit.182 That
position strips racial minorities who are attempting to challenge a
measure that they deem counter to their political and legal interests of
their voices. Lani Guinier invites public institutions to practice racial
literacy. 183 Courts also need to adopt this practice of being cognizant of

180. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982) (quoting Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
181. The National Conference of State Legislatures defines “affirmative action” as:
In institutions of higher education, affirmative action refers to admission policies that
provide equal access to education for those groups that have been historically excluded
or underrepresented, such as women and minorities.
See Affirmative Action: Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 7, 2014)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-overview.aspx.
182. This conclusion is supported by the Schuette Court’s reasoning:
[T]he court would next be required to determine the policy realms in which certain
groups—groups defined by race—have a political interest. That undertaking, again
without guidance from any accepted legal standard, would risk, in turn, the creation of
incentives for those who support or oppose certain policies to cast the debate in terms
of racial advantage or disadvantage. There would be no apparent limiting standards.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1635.
183. Guinier explains:
A racially literate institution uses race as a diagnostic device, an analytic tool, and an
instrument of process. As a diagnostic or evidentiary device, race helps identify the
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America’s racial history and the ways in which race pervades
institutions and practices. Adjudicating cases from that perspective will
ensure that courts appropriately interrogate legal measures that have
the appearance of formal equality but the effect of unequal treatment
corresponding to race.
Following Seattle’s guidance, the Schuette Court could have
determined that Michigan’s amendment implicated race by considering
the law’s language, genesis, and operation. Even though Seattle’s
Initiative 350 did not expressly mention race or the policy of
desegregation,184 the Court in Seattle determined that there was
evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the initiative was
a response to the school district’s plan to racially integrate schools by
assigning children to various schools and busing them to designated
locations.185 Just as the Seattle Court looked to those factors, the
Schuette Court could have done the same to conclude that Proposal 2
directly targeted race in that it was an anti-affirmative action measure.
A finding that the challenged amendment draws upon race is even
more supported in Schuette when one compares the language of both
legal measures. Michigan’s Proposal 2 used the word “race” whereas
Seattle’s Initiative did not. Nonetheless, the Seattle Court determined
that the conclusion regarding the initiative’s racial focus was warranted.
The Court reasoned that where “the political process or the
decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially conscious
legislation – and only such legislation – is singled out for peculiar and
disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly ‘rests on
distinctions based on race.’”186
Given that Schuette misapplied Reitman and failed to distinguish
Hunter and Seattle, the Court should have applied the political process
doctrine. Upon determining that Michigan’s amendment had a racial
underlying problems affecting higher education. Racial literacy begins by defining race
as a structural problem rather than a purely individual one. Race reveals the ways in
which demography is often destiny — not just for people of color, but for working-class
and poor whites as well. Race constantly influences access to public resources, while
also revealing the influence of class and geographical variables. Racial literacy,
therefore, continuously links the underrepresentation of blacks and Latinos to the
underrepresentation of poor people generally. At a minimum, it reminds public
institutions of higher learning that ‘the idea of access is deeply embedded in [their]
genetic code’ and thus, the underrepresentation of certain demographic groups
illuminates their failure to fulfill their public responsibilities.
Guinier, supra note 30, at 201–02 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
184. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 489; see Wash. Rev. Code § 28.A26.010 (1981).
185. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 485–87.
186. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
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focus because it targeted affirmative action and that the amendment
levied a special burden on certain minorities by removing raceconscious school policy decisions from the province of the board of
trustees to a “new and remote level of government,”187 the Court
should have evaluated the constitutional soundness of the amendment
in terms of strict scrutiny pursuant to the requirements of the political
process doctrine and Equal Protection Clause precedent.188
3. Strategic Maneuvers of the Court to Neutralize the Application
of Disparate Impact Theory to Racial Inequalities in Education
The Schuette decision can be explained in part by the Court’s
recognition of the strategic importance of the political process doctrine
and the doctrine’s reliance, at times, on disparate impact theory.189 The
theory incorporates the disparate impact concept in that the inquiry
does not stop at confirming whether formal equality has been achieved.
Instead, it allows for the examination of the effect of the challenged
legal provision on discrete and insular groups to assess whether it
satisfies the Equal Protection Clause. Ely conceptualized judicial
review of laws from a political process perspective as allowing the
judiciary to draw “inference[s] of unconstitutional motivation” based
upon “pattern of impact.”190 From Ely’s perspective, courts may
invalidate laws even when those laws formally require that individuals
be treated equally.191
For example, in Hunter, the Court concluded that even though the
amendment at issue was facially neutral, it nonetheless functioned to
distinguish individuals on the basis of race, separating “those groups
who sought the law’s protection against racial, religious, or ancestral
discriminations in the sale and rental of real estate and those who
sought to regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other
ends.”192 The Schuette Court recognized this relationship between the
political process framework and disparate impact theory.193 For this
187. Id. at 483.
188. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
189. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1625 (2014). (conceding
that Proposal 2 would not survive the doctrine).
190. ELY, supra note 6, at 139.
191. Ely concludes that the formal neutrality of the law is insufficient to shield it from judicial
invalidation. See generally ELY, supra note 6, at 135–79.
192. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 (1969).
193. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1627, 1630–38.
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reason, it tried to dilute the doctrine, first by suggesting that there is a
discriminatory intent requirement attached to it194 and second by
suggesting that the cases that gave rise to the doctrine should be
overturned or not extended further.195 Contrary, to the intimation of
the Schuette Court, the political process doctrine does not have a
requisite discriminatory intent element. As Seattle made clear, “[w]e
have not insisted on a particularized inquiry into motivation in all equal
protection cases.”196 Therefore, establishing that the motivations
prompting the adoption of the challenged law are of an invidious racial
nature is not a prerequisite for a successful equal protection challenge
by means of the political process theory.197
4.
Justice Kennedy’s New Replacement Standard for
Strict Scrutiny
Julian Eule highlights Article VI as the source of the obligation of
all government actors to operate in a manner that conforms with and
sustains the United States Constitution.198 The obligation imposes
principled limitations on lawmakers and interpreters of this
foundational document. As Eule persuasively argues, a comparable
restraining element is absent in the case of the electorate.199 This makes
the Schuette Court’s conclusion all the more troubling.200 Instead of
applying strict scrutiny, the Schuette Court adopted a deferential
posture. In essence, the Court applied a rational basis standard.201
Justice Kennedy, however, made a statement that invites the query of
194. Id. at 1625, 1629 –38.
195. Id. at 1635–36.
196. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484–85 (1982).
197. In support of this conclusion, the Seattle Court quoted Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, stating that “[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation,
is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.” Id. at 485
(quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
198. Eule, supra note 7 at 1536. Article VI provides in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
199. Eule, supra note 7, at 1537 (“Article VI imposes the obligations of constitutional
compliance on public officers, not the electorate.”).
200. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638.
201. The Court does not expressly state the standard according to which it evaluated
Michigan’s amendment. See id. However, its deferential posture towards the amendment, which
is evident throughout the decision, and its conclusion that there is no legal authority that would
permit it to invalidate the law, suggest that it applied a rational basis standard. See id.
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whether the Court adopted a new standard of judicial review where
racial minorities who bring equal protection challenges are concerned.
His words lend support to Reva Siegel’s claim that there is a disturbing
division in the way that the Court has interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause, since Brown v. Board of Education, to extend extraordinary
protection to the rights of the majority population and limited
protection to “discrete and insular” racial minorities.202 Justice
Kennedy opines that, “It is demeaning to the democratic process to
presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this
sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”203
If one may read “decent and rational” grounds as the replacement
standard for strict scrutiny when laws that threaten the constitutional
protections and guarantees of racial minorities are challenged, it is ill
formed and fails to assure any protection whatsoever. In applying this
lenient standard, the Court failed to fulfill its role of engaging in
“representation-reinforcing . . . judicial review.”204 One can read
Kennedy’s words as stating, if a majority of voters decide that racial
minorities are not entitled to participate equally in the political process
that determine matters which profoundly shape such minorities’ lives,
that is constitutionally permissible. Yet, such an outcome clearly
contravenes the equal protection and political participation principles
established in the Constitution and certain statutes.205
5. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Receptiveness to the Political
Process Doctrine in Other Contexts
In other contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has been receptive to
political process arguments. Romer v. Evans206 offers a revealing
glimpse into the Court’s view of voter initiatives that infringe upon the
equal protection rights of other groups besides those which are racially
constructed207 and it sheds light on what the Court deems to constitute
202. Siegel, supra note 13.
203. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637 (emphasis added).
204. ELY, supra note 6, at 87.
205. The Colorado Supreme Court drew a similar conclusion:
[T]he facts remain that ‘[o]ne’s right to life, liberty, and property . . . and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcomes of no
elections,’ West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1185,
87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), and that ‘[a] citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be infringed
simply because a majority of people choose that it be.’ Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736, 84 S. Ct. 1459, 1474, 12 L.Ed.2d 632 (1964).
See Evans v. Romer (Evans I), 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
206. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
207. Referencing numerous Colorado codes, the Romer Court identifies the protected class
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animus. Romer involved a voter-initiated amendment to Colorado’s
constitution.208 According to Colorado’s initiative process, in order to
qualify a proposal for presentation to the general electorate,
proponents must obtain “signatures by registered electors in an amount
equal to at least five percent of the total number of votes cast for all
candidates of the office of secretary of state at the previous general
election.”209 Colorado voters and others drafted an amendment to their
state constitution, known as Amendment 2,210 in response to a series of
municipal and state laws enacted prohibiting discrimination on several
bases, including sexual orientation.211 After obtaining the required
number of signatures, the secretary of state placed the amendment on
the ballot for consideration by Colorado’s voters. Amendment 2
“passed by a margin of 813,966 to 710,151 (53.4% to 46.6%).”212
Several groups challenged Amendment 2 alleging that it hindered
their ability to participate equally in the political process thereby
impermissibly burdening their right to equal protection.213 The
Colorado Supreme Court in Evans I, relying upon Hunter, concluded
that, “Hunter applies to a broad spectrum of discriminatory
legislation”214 not just racially-focused legislation that is discriminatory.
The court further reasoned that, where an “identifiable group” is
uniquely burdened in its ability to participate equally in the political
process, the political process doctrine governs, and strict scrutiny of the
challenged legal measure is warranted.215 Relying upon that approach,
as “homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.” Id. at 624.
208. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1272.
209. COLO. CONST. art. V §1 para. 2.
210. Colorado Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. amend. II.
211. Romer, 517 U.S. at 629 (noting Colorado’s implementation of a variety of ordinances
and statutes that “set forth an extensive catalog of traits which cannot be the basis for
discrimination, including age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a
minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental disability of an individual or of his or her
associates – and, in recent times, sexual orientation”).
212. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1272.
213. Id. at 1273.
214. Id. at 1282.
215. Id. at 1276.
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the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s issuance of a
preliminary injunction staying the enforcement of Amendment 2.216
The case came before the state supreme court again in Evans II, at
which time that court affirmed that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of judicial review217 and upheld the lower court’s grant of a
permanent injunction precluding the enforcement of Amendment 2
because of the government’s failure to satisfy the requirements of strict
scrutiny.218 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the state
supreme court’s holding under different rationales.219
Timing,220 the concept of neutrality,221 the scope of Amendment 2
extending beyond the “private sphere”222 requiring application to
“general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in
governmental and private settings,”223 and the singular focus of the
amendment on persons of “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation” signaling animus224 are all rationales that the Court offered
for its decision. The difference in justifications complicated Romer’s
use as a valuable precedent for BAMN but it by no means disqualified
it. Notably, the Court’s reasoning with respect to the singular focus of
the challenged law trained on a specific class and the different process
the law subjected that class to if its members wished to restore the
measures designed to ensure their equality evinces the influence of
political process theory.225 If the Court had considered similar factors
216. Id. at 1286 (“Because the defendants and their amici have not proffered any compelling
state interest to justify their enactment of Amendment 2 at this stage of the proceedings as
required under the strict scrutiny standard of review [], we conclude that plaintiff’s have met their
burden.”) (citations omitted).
217. Evans v. Romer (Evans II), 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Colo. 1994) (“We reaffirm our holding
that the constitutionality of Amendment 2 must be determined with reference to the strict scrutiny
standard of review.”).
218. Id. at 1350.
219. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–36 (1996). Although the Court did not explicitly
reference political process theory, Romer is relevant to political process theory precedent because
the Court relied upon aspects of the theory to reach its holding. See id.
220. Id. at 623–24.
221. Id. at 623.
222. Id. at 629.
223. Id. at 630.
224. Id. at 624.
225. The Romer Court’s reliance upon the concepts of political process theory is particularly
evident in two places in the decision. The Court noted that “[t]he amendment withdraws from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination,
and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.” Id. at 627. In another place, the Court
concludes that as a result of Amendment 2, “[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that
others enjoy or may seek without restraint. They can obtain specific protection against
discrimination only be enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution or
perhaps, on the State’s view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability.” Id. at 631.
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in Schuette, the result would have been the invalidation of Proposal 2.
Just as the timing of Colorado’s Amendment closely followed the
passage of local and state laws prohibiting discrimination based upon
sexual orientation, Proposal 2 was an immediate response to Grutter.
Colorado’s amendment impacted the quality of life for the LGBT
community, in the areas of buying homes, shopping, securing
employment, etc. So too, Michigan’s Proposal 2 has had widespread
reverberating negative effects—not only for disfavored racial
minorities, but also for society as a whole. This is because Proposal 2
impacts equal access to education, which is essential to achieving the
important societal goals of racial integration, having a well-educated
polity, and having open pathways to assuming gainful employment and
roles of leadership. Further, it forecloses avenues that were previously
available to marginalized racial minorities to participate in the creation
of educational policies that affect the quality of education available to
them. Upholding Proposal 2 does not result in a neutral application of
the laws; it preserves the status quo of racial inequality.
The Romer Court focused on the way that Amendment 2 operated
to single out individuals based upon their sexual orientation.
Specifically, the Court noted that the amendment “identifies persons
by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board.”226
The Court also found credible the arguments asserting that
Amendment 2 was motivated by animus towards the LGBT
community.227 Because its origins were grounded in animus, the Court
held that no legitimate interest could be stated for it.228 Regarding its
conclusions that animus motivated the passage of Amendment 2, the
Court considered both the singling out nature of the measure and the
timing of placing the proposal on the ballot.229
As a preliminary matter, demonstrating that animus motivated the
contested law is not a requirement necessary to assess the
constitutional validity of a measure under political process theory as it
was initially conceived230 and applied in race-based equal protection
226. Id. at 633–35.
227. Id. at 632.
228. The Court concluded the law must be held invalid because it was “born of animosity”
and “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.” Id. at 634–35 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
229. Romer v. Evans, 512 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
230. The Carolene Products footnote does not identify intentional discriminatory motivation
as the predicate for judicial intervention. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938). Instead, the emphasis was on the failings of the political system which can operate to
repeatedly discount the political interests of discrete and insular minorities or bar them from
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challenges.231 Accordingly, even if there is no evidence of the intention
to discriminate on the basis of race, if the implementation of the legal
measure results in unequal treatment in that respect, then strict scrutiny
is required to assess whether it is legally justified. 232 In its future rulings
on matters involving political process theory, the Court should not
adopt an animus element. Introducing an intent standard divests the
political process argument of its power and ensures that it will be
difficult to invalidate voter initiatives that burden minority groups.
In any event, just as the Court found animus to be at the root of
Amendment 2, it could have found that it was present in the Schuette
case. There are similarities between the motivations prompting the
state and local governments of Colorado to implement
antidiscrimination laws to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination
and the reasons prompting the federal government and higher
education academic institutions to adopt laws and policies designed to
protect racial minorities and ensure equal treatment for them. The
federal government recognized in adopting civil rights legislation that
African Americans were experiencing racial discrimination in
employment, education and other venues in which they needed
protection.233 American universities and colleges designed affirmative
action policies for a variety of reasons including expanding access to
their institutions for underrepresented ethnic and racial groups.234
Therefore, crafting legislation designed to eradicate such policies where
there remain significant disparities in educational opportunities can be
viewed as an intention to cause harm to those groups that immediately
benefit from such measures.
Writing for the majority in Romer, Justice Kennedy concluded that
the effect of Amendment 2 was to prohibit the maintenance or future
adoption of any laws designed to protect gay people from
participating in the system altogether.
231. Neither Hunter nor Seattle list racial animus as a requirement of the theory. See Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467
(1982). Notably, racial focus is not the same as racial animus. Affirmative action policies designed
to address racial inequalities may have a racial focus without being motivated by a malevolent
purpose to inflict harm.
232. As the Hunter Court reasoned regarding the charter amendment, “[A]lthough the law
on its face treats Negro and white Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the
law’s impact falls on the minority.” Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
233. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
234. See Caroline Keeler, The Evolution of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, in EDUC
300: EDUCATION REFORM, PAST, AND PRESENT (May 3, 2013), http://commons.trincoll.edu
/edreform/2013/05/the-evolution-of-affirmative-action-in-higher-education/; see also CHARLES
DALE, FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY (2005).
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discrimination, which bore no reasonable relationship to the
government’s purported legitimate reasons. Romer demonstrates that
the Court is capable of recognizing identifiable groups who assert their
interests collectively235 and is capable of applying the concepts of
political process theory, as necessary, to hold harmful disabling laws
constitutionally invalid. The Court needs to adopt a similar posture in
the future when evaluating anti-affirmative action ballot measures.
II. THE RISE OF THE VOTER INITIATIVE IN THE EDUCATION REALM
AND THE ATTENUATING EFFECTS ON THE RIGHTS OF RACIAL
MINORITIES
Race-conscious legal measures, policies, and programs are
undergoing a siege. The voter initiative is one popular means of attack;
another vehicle is legislative action.236 Numerous states including,
California, Michigan, Arizona, Washington, Nebraska, and Oklahoma,
have relied upon direct democracy mechanisms to prohibit affirmative
action.237 When Florida’s former Governor Jeb Bush led the charge
against affirmative action with his One Florida executive order,
minorities were effectively shut out of weighing in on the process
because the governor implemented it “without inviting public
comment.”238
Derrick Bell, an early prognosticator of the dangers voter initiatives
and referenda pose for racial minorities,239 concluded that such
mechanisms “operate as a nonracial façade covering distinctly
discriminatory measures.”240 Many of his insights have been borne out
in the cycle of actions concerning matters of inequality and

235. Romer v. Evans, 512 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
236. In New Hampshire, for example, the legislature enacted a law prohibiting affirmative
action in public employment and education. See New Hampshire, Chapter 227, HB 623, (2011
Session). See Peter Schmidt, New Hampshire Ends Affirmative Action Preferences at Colleges,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Jan. 4, 2012), https://chronicle.com/article/NewHampshire-Ends/130196/.
237. For a list of states that have relied upon ballot initiatives to challenge affirmative action,
see Affirmative Action: State Action, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx. In 1998 Washington
state adopted a voter-initiated ban on affirmative action, followed by Michigan in 2006, Nebraska
in 2008, Arizona in 2010, and Oklahoma in 2012. See id.
238. See Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils Florida on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES,
February 4, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/04/us/jeb-bush-roils-florida-on-affirmativeaction.html.
239. Bell, supra note 4.
240. Id. at 23.
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education.241 This defeating cycle begins with the well-intentioned raceconscious admissions policies designed to address inequalities and
achieve ethnically and racially diverse student populations.242 The cycle
progresses to the lawsuits challenging the policies.243 The lawsuits are
often framed in terms of the Equal Protection Clause.244 The cycle
continues on through Supreme Court decisions, which either uphold
the school’s race-conscious policy but place severe restrictions on its
use,245 or strike the policy down.246 If the Court upholds the policy, the
next stage is the voter initiative that becomes a state law prohibiting
affirmative action.247 In some instances, following the enactment of a
state law, there is a later stage involving opponents of the state ban who
challenge its constitutionality.248 The grim outcome of the cycle is that
affirmative action is in danger of being eradicated as an option to
address racial inequalities in education even though its objectives are
far from complete.
Ballot initiatives present a particularly vexing challenge for civil
rights advocates who seek to accomplish integrationist, education

241. Id. at 11–12.
242. Id. at 6.
243. Id. at 7.
244. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 249–50 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
(Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205
(2016).
245. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (remanding the case to the Fifth Circuit for the application
of strict scrutiny to the University of Texas’ admissions policies); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (upholding
the use of race in admissions decisions but only as one of numerous “plus factors” that may be
considered in evaluating candidates); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (upholding Texas’ narrowly
tailored incorporation of race as a factor in its admissions decisions but placing severe limits on
when race can be considered). Because the jurisprudence is locked within a cycle, even the Court’s
holding in Fisher II, which is a positive outcome for affirmative action, provides insufficient
protection for race-conscious policies because the next step in the process for Texas may be an
anti-affirmative action ballot initiative. See id.
246. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275–76 (striking down Michigan’s undergraduate race-conscious
admissions policy); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (holding the school’s race-sensitive admissions policies
constitutionally-invalid).
247. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a). The anti-affirmative action Proposition 209 “passed by
a margin of 54 to 46 percent . . . . [N]early 9 million Californians cast[] ballots, 4,736,180 voted in
favor of the initiative and 3,986,196 voted against it.” Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d
692, 697 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit upheld the amendment in the Wilson case. Id. Several
years later, in an applied challenge, the Ninth Circuit held that the equal protection claim was
precluded by the court’s previous 1997 ruling. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128
(9th Cir. 2012)
248. The Wilson, Brown, and Schuette cases are examples of challenges to anti-affirmative
action legal measures. See Wilson, 122 F.3d 692; Brown, 674 F.3d 1128; Schuette v. Coal. to
Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
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access, and diversity goals,249 in part, through affirmative action.
Empirical evidence suggests that when the majority white population
is presented with ballot initiatives that are deemed counter to the
interests of certain disfavored minority groups, they are likely to vote
in favor of adopting them.250 Todd Donovan posits that whereas ballot
initiatives that pertain to the populace at large (e.g. proposed laws on
taxes) are likely to be voted upon based upon perceived economic
interest. He states, “[r]eferendums on minority rights have the capacity
to be largely about approving or disapproving members of a minority
group[] . . . Indeed, awareness of which group is affected by a policy
may itself be a heuristic that voters use when deciding on a
proposal[].”251 Racial minority groups who have experienced
oppression and disenfranchisement within American society are
unlikely to fare well when issues that are perceived to be in their
interest are turned over to a plebiscite.252 Where the issue is deemed to
be detrimental to them, however, it is likely to pass by a majority vote.253
There are other reasons to be concerned about direct democracy.
The characteristics of voter initiatives make them inimical to
constitutional freedoms and guarantees. The contemporary “initiative
process . . . lacks some of the critical elements of the representative
system of government, including debate, deliberation, flexibility,

249. In her majority opinion for Grutter, Justice O’Connor enumerates a number of positives
associated with diversity (including racial diversity) that make it a compelling interest such as,
“promot[ing] learning outcomes,” “‘prepar[ing] students for an increasingly diverse workforce,’”
facilitating the “military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security,” and
achieving the nation’s civic objectives.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31 (citing various amici briefs).
O’Connor further writes that, “[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups
in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.
Id. at 330–32.
250. See, e.g., Barbara Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245 (1997);
Eule, supra note 7; Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1730, 1745 (2013) (“In sum, previous election results suggest that voters have not
been sympathetic to minority rights and interests when questions affecting those issues were
placed on the ballot.”); David Magleby, Direct Legislation in the American States, in
REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY (David
Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994)
251. Donovan, supra note 250, at 1735 (citations omitted).
252. Donovan claims that “[d]ecision making on issues that affect a clearly identifiable group,
moreover, may be structured by positive or negative affect for the group.” Donovan, supra note
250, at 1737 (citation omitted).
253. See Donovan, supra note 250, at 1778 (concluding that “[m]inority rights and popular
opinion are often in conflict in democratic political systems.”). See also John C. Brittain, Direct
Democracy by the Majority Can Jeopardize the Civil Rights of Minority or Other Powerless
Groups, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. REV. 144 (1996) (reviewing scholarship and cases supporting
his argument that direct democracy harms the rights of minorities); Magleby, supra note 250.
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compromise and transparency.”254 Further, voter initiatives are
susceptible to manipulation by special interest groups.255 The events
surrounding Proposal 2, as discussed in the following section, clearly
illustrate this point. The harm not only affects marginalized racial
minorities, but also the Constitution and the goal of equal
representation. Privileging direct democracy vehicles for matters
concerning equal protection of the laws and voting rights undermines
the principle of one person, one vote and the very notion of minority
political representation.256
The legislative framework is preferable and more egalitarian, with
respect to politically disadvantaged racial minorities, than a voterinitiative constitutional amendment process for several reasons.257 It
adds a layer of protection to the constitutional rights being challenged.
Legislatively adopting laws allows for an airing of the issues that will
include advocates articulating minority interests, as identified by the
advocates’ constituencies. Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller posit that,
when constitutional amendments and other laws are reviewed by
elected officials in the legislature “[it] permits minorities to aggregate
and leverage their strength; publicly recorded votes and electoral
competition build accountability into the system and the mere presence
254. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52, at 4 (2002). Regarding transparency,
proponents of the initiatives often do not heavily publicize them to make their passage easier. For
example, in New Hampshire, State representative Gary Hopper who co-sponsored antiaffirmative action legislation there, attributed its successful adoption to the limited press it
received and the incorrect assumptions of its likely opponents that it would be rejected. In his
interview with State Representative Hopper, Peter Schmidt reported:
[Hopper] said he believes that supporters of affirmative action might have been lulled
by the state’s defeat of similar measures in the past. When he first co-sponsored such a
bill in 2000, he said, the legislature’s meeting rooms ‘were full of people fighting against
it.’ This time around, he speculated, ‘people were caught off guard’ and ‘did not pay any
attention’ because they assumed such a measure would fail.
See Schmidt, supra note 236.
255. Magleby, supra note 250.
256. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 564 (1964) (“[E]ach citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation in political processes of his state’s legislative bodies . . . full and
effective participation . . . requires that each citizen has an equally effective voice in election of
members of his state legislature.”).
257. For a counter view, see scholarship questioning the efficacy of state legislatures in
protecting the rights of racial minorities. For example, Matthew Streb argues that the legislative
record on minority issues as compared to voter initiative outcomes needs to be meticulously
studied before any conclusions can be drawn regarding which mechanism is more favorable and
fairer to minorities. See MATTHEW J. STREB, RETHINKING AMERICAN ELECTORAL
DEMOCRACY 66 (3d ed. 2016). Richard Briffault comments that “it is difficult to argue that
historically minorities –in particular, blacks and other racial minorities—did all that well in state
legislatures. Racial discrimination was largely a product of state legislative action, not initiative
votes.” Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1364 (1985).
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of minorities in the legislature may deter the worst forms of legislative
prejudice.”258 Legislative debate also positions the issues for review by
courts. Litigants may draw upon the legislative record, as they prepare
their equal protection cases. In turn, this information can provide useful
source material for judges to comprehend the history of the legislation,
its objectives, and the costs and benefits to the political interests
involved.
In Schuette, those organizing the voter initiative relied upon the
unfiltered amendment process. Even though some groups raised issues
regarding the fairness and integrity of the process early on, none of the
courts adequately addressed them. The Schuette Court developed a
myopic vision of democracy when it placed its faith in a distorted
process. When you permit state constitutional amendment through
voter initiatives that ultimately impact on federal constitutional
protections in place for racial minorities (and others), it potentially
renders those protections ineffectual. This is true especially where
courts adopt a deferential posture towards the amendments. The
nuances, historical background, and intentions behind the Equal
Protection Clause and race-conscious policies are not given due
consideration by the larger populace. Failing to take these
considerations into account can result in the invalidation of policies and
programs geared towards achieving racial equality.259
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Breaking the Cycle
The cycle that the fight for educational equality is enmeshed in can
be broken by exposing the perils voter initiatives pose to a wellfunctioning representative republican government, by limiting their
use, by challenging the rhetoric that casts direct democracy as the
ultimate fulfillment of egalitarian objectives, by holding courts
accountable for fulfilling their constitutional duties, and by positing an
alternative vision of participatory democracy that aims at substantive
equality. This Article’s recommendations are developed in three parts.
One part pertains specifically to courts and their responsibilities in

258. Cain & Miller, supra note 3, at 50.
259. In another article, Cain and Miller reach a similar conclusion, commenting that
“[i]nitiative government leads to a higher level of policy responsiveness to the median statewide
voters, but it produces biases against individual and minority rights—precisely what the checks
and balances system was meant to protect.” Id. at 42.
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reviewing direct democracy instruments that infringe upon
constitutional rights. The second part refers to voter initiatives. The
third part concerns the public officials and administrators charged with
the formulation of school policies.
1. The Court’s Role in Achieving Substantive Equality in
Education and the Participation of Racial Minorities in Public Policy
Decisionmaking
Courts have an instrumental role to play in achieving substantive
equality in education and in voting. The American legal regime permits
individuals to craft initiatives on a wide range of issues that implicate
federal constitutional principles and guarantees,260 but when those
issues pertain to racial equality, the Court must treat them with
circumspection, not deference. As Schuette demonstrates, voter
initiatives can be structured and wielded in ways that limit the ability
of marginalized racial minorities to fully participate in the democratic
process and that effectively deny them political representation. If left
unchecked, such mechanisms have the potential to undermine the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution and statutory laws
regarding equality principles. The Court in Reynolds v. Sims,
emphasized that, “a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands
judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us.”261 An
informed judiciary that is versed in the Constitution and relevant state
constitutions will render better decisions and engage in the proper
balancing analysis as compared to the electorate. The arguments that
litigants present to the court will be framed in terms of constitutional
principles and other legal sources. By way of written opinion, courts will
offer their reasoning in those terms or by reference to precedent. The
exercise of judicial reasoning within this framework of legal doctrines,
laws, and constitutional principles provides for a more thorough
consideration of contested laws than voters who must decide on an
initiative.
When confronted with a voter initiative, like Proposal 2, that seeks
to undo Supreme Court precedent within a particular state, precedent
should prevail because of the federal constitutional interests at stake.
As the Court’s recognized in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, “[w]hen a State
exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is
insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried
260. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52.
261. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
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over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a
federally protected right.”262 The right at stake is the ability of racial
minorities to engage in meaningful political participation without being
subjected to disenfranchising barriers that assume the shape of formal
equality.
While it is important not to rely solely on courts for solutions, courts
are an integral part of ensuring that representative government
functions effectively for all. Exacting judicial review supported by state
laws is necessary to strike down initiatives that have a disenfranchising
effect or that are tainted by fraud.263 Courts are particularly important
where there are no designated local or state agencies in place to
counter the possibility that individual constitutional rights did not get
fair and due consideration.
The Schuette case highlights the significance of the political process
argument as a tool to ensure the equal representation of disfavored
minority political interests. The plurality’s decision was seriously
deficient in its treatment of this theory and left unresolved many
questions regarding: the standard of judicial review when racial
classifications are involved, federalism and the Court’s precedents and
authority relative to state powers, and the political process doctrine. 264
While the Court may be resistant to this theory in part because it entails
disparate impact analysis, accomplishing substantive equality requires
an examination of the effects of laws rather than merely looking to how
they are facially characterized.265 It is necessary for the Court to affirm
its power and authority to undertake the relevant analysis. Political
process theory is an essential mechanism to counter majoritarian
actions that subordinate the federal constitutional rights of racial
minorities to the political will of the majority. For this reason, courts
262. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960); see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566.
263. This Article concurs with Derrick Bell regarding the level of judicial review necessary
to furnish the requisite protection. Bell writes, “The evidence, both historical and contemporary,
justifies a heightened scrutiny of ballot legislation similar to that recognized as appropriate when
the normal legislative process carries potential harm to the rights of minority individuals.” Bell,
supra note 4, at 23.
264. See Mark Strasser, Schuette Electoral Process Guarantees and the New Neutrality, 94
NEB. L. REV. 60 (2015) (discussing the confusion the Schuette opinion has caused in the areas of
electoral processes, equal protection, and political process theory).
265. Christopher Schmidt engages in a textual and historical analysis of the word “equal,”
the Fourteenth Amendment, and equal protection jurisprudence to conclude that in order to
properly apply the Equal Protection Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court must recognize disparate
impact theory. See generally Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection
Clause: Why the Definition of ‘Equal’ Requires a Disproportionate Impact Analysis When Laws
Unequally Affect Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (2002).
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should be receptive to the argument if it is presented in future cases.266
2. Restricting and Reforming Voter Initiatives
The next set of recommendations primarily pertains to voter
initiatives. Direct democracy, without judicial review, is not the
appropriate vehicle to decide matters concerning equal protection and
voting rights guarantees. Due to the patriotic, idealistic, and nostalgic
sentiments of the electorate, revising voter initiatives may prove to be
taxing.267 Nonetheless, reform is desperately needed. The empirical
evidence identifying the costs they inflict on the stability and proper
functioning of the political system should provide substantial fuel for
any reform campaign. 268 Since it will be difficult to persuade states to
reconfigure the parameters of ballot initiatives according to the
recommendations herein, courts should be prepared to deter their use
for the aforementioned purposes by invalidating them where it can be
demonstrated that the burdens they place on federally protected rights
are greater than the state interest advanced and any asserted interest
in preserving direct democracy.
Despite the challenging aspects of reforming voter initiatives, states
should make an effort to do so, consulting the best practices and
recommendations of the National Conference of State Legislatures
Initiative and Referendum Task Force and other useful empirical
studies.269 The Task Force makes thirty-four recommendations that
address many deficiencies of direct democracy.270 The
recommendations cover the areas of the role of the legislature, the
substance of the initiative, the “drafting and certification phase,” “the
signature gathering phase,” “voter education,” “financial disclosure,”
and “voting on initiatives.”271
As its beginning point, the Task Force counsels against
implementing voter initiative procedures in states that do not presently
provide for them because of the threats they pose to fair and
meaningful representation of the citizenry and to constitutional
266. For example, if Fisher II provokes activists to campaign for an anti-affirmative action
ballot initiative and affirmative action proponents challenge it, the Court should at the very least,
acknowledge that it possesses the power to decide the issues presented and proceed with the
appropriate analysis.
267. See generally ROBERT ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN
AMERICA 132 (2002).
268. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52.
269. Id.
270. See id. at ix–xii (summarizing the recommendations).
271. Id.
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freedoms. In making this recommendation, the Task Force notes that
voter initiatives often operate without adequate safeguards to ensure
against voter manipulation and fraud and, furthermore, allow political
interest groups to bypass the protections built into the political
structure (e.g. legislative debate and hearings).272 Although the Task
Force proposes some sound strategies,273 notably the recommendation
that states should not adopt a “constitutional amendment initiative
process,”274 even with the proposed reforms, direct democracy poses
significant risks to constitutional rights and exceptional risks for
minorities that must be mitigated by judicial intervention.
It is the duty of all states to make a conscientious effort to structure
democracy so that it is representative of and responsive to the whole
polity. One step in that direction is ensuring that the instruments of
political participation are properly used and designed to accurately
register rather than impede the political interests of discrete and insular
minorities. The following suggestions are offered with those objectives
in mind.
States should place restrictions on the subject matter of voter
initiatives to remove from their purview issues concerning fundamental
federal constitutional guarantees. This is necessary given the
substantial scholarship demonstrating that voters are either woefully
uninformed of the implications of their votes, misled by the
presentation of the issues, or acting out of negative stereotypes to the
detriment of marginalized minorities.275 Further, states should restrict
initiatives to being legislative proposals rather than permitting their use
as direct vehicles for constitutional amendment.

272. Id. at ix.
273. It is beyond the scope of this project to evaluate all of the Task Force’s
recommendations.
274. Id. at ix. Bruce Cain and Roger Noll have also decried the shortcomings of the initiative
constitutional amendment process as compared to the more deliberative process of constitution
revision. See Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1523 (2009). They note that the former is more
destabilizing in that it is subject to manipulation by partisan groups seeking to constitutionally
solidify their positions and it appeals to the emotions of voters rather than reasoned analysis
whereas the latter has the advantage of a tiered process of ratification by voters and elected
representatives. See id.
275. See John C. Brittain, Direct Democracy by the Majority Can Jeopardize the Civil Rights
of Minority or Other Powerless Groups, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. REV. 144 (1996). See also
Donovan, supra note 84, at 1745; Bell, supra note 4; Eule, supra note 7, at 1545 (1990); TASK
REPORT, supra note 52.
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State governments should be required to have clear procedures for
investigating complaints of voter fraud and deceptive practices
associated with voter initiatives. The agencies charged with the task of
investigation and enforcement should be identified and held
accountable. Where an agency fails to appropriately fulfill its duty, the
challenged initiative should not be certified. When substantial abuses
of the system occur, like those leading to the certification of Proposal
2, the petition should be invalidated and penalties imposed on those
committing and orchestrating the fraud. Courts should act with the
necessary speed to resolve an issue before it is presented to the
electorate. Where timing is an issue, the court should issue an injunction
even if this means that consideration of the matter by the electorate is
delayed for several months.
As the OKD case illustrates, not only can voter initiative review
procedures be deficient at the early phases of signature gathering and
certification, but also the process for constitutional amendment may be
severely lacking in terms of the requirements for passage. For example,
in many states, including Michigan, the ballot initiative only requires a
simple majority.276 If states are resistant to restricting the subject matter
of voter initiatives, at a minimum the correctives should include a
supermajority requirement and legislative review and approval. 277
3. The Role of Governing Boards, Public School Officials and
Administrators in the Decisionmaking Process
Governing boards, public school officials, and administrators are
integral to the decisionmaking that determines the content of the
policies, such as whether to adopt legacy preferences,278 for public
academic institutions. Boards also appoint university presidents,
establish budgets, approve curriculum changes and university
276. MICH. CONST. art. 12, § 2.
277. In this respect, this Article agrees with numerous scholars, including Robert Ellis, who
have written about the dangers of amending state constitutions through voter initiatives. Ellis
considers the requirements that most states have in place to allow legislative changes to their
constitutions in comparison to the requirements for constitutional amendment through voter
initiatives. See ELLIS, supra note 267, at 124. He notes that while an amendment of the
constitution by the legislature typically requires a supermajority, surprisingly, many states only
require a simply majority to amend the state constitution via a voter initiative. Id. Ellis maintains
that this difference in treatment is illogical. Id. If anything, it would make sense for the informed
legislature to have more lenient requirements to accomplish a constitutional amendment. See id.
at 127. Eule also posits that, “simple majorities cannot be expected consistently to honor the
interests of minorities and guarantee individual liberties.” See Eule, supra note 7, at 1554.
278. See Richard Kahlenberg, Elite Colleges, or Colleges for the Elite, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/opinion/30kahlenberg.html.
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contracts.279 While their actions are also appropriately subject to
judicial review, their positioning as entities that have extensive insight
into the goals of institutions, the educational needs of their state, the
demographics of their region, and the educational goals of society,
mean that their decisionmaking power should not be so easily
supplanted by the process of direct democracy. They are engaged in
ongoing reflection on these matters in ways that differ from the larger
electorate and courts. The decision to include race-conscious measures
like affirmative action into admissions policies was the product of
dialogue and consideration of the aforementioned factors.280
Affirmative action in this context is geared towards educational
enrichment and equality, and decisions about that, when race is
involved, must be made by educational authorities with appropriate
judicial oversight, not popular votes. Schuette demonstrates that the
popular vote suppresses the voices of racial minorities, whereas
decisions by the educators enhance those voices.281
B. Whether Formulating Arguments According to Yoshino’s Vision of
“The New Equal Protection” Offers A Viable Alternative Strategy
for Achieving the Equal Access of Racial Minorities to the
Political Process in Public Universities
Kenji Yoshino poses the provocative question of whether this
moment in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court marks “the end of
constitutional civil rights in this country.”282 He posits that the Court
has turned its judicial frame away from equality-based arguments of
the Fourteenth Amendment to liberty-based claims of the First
Amendment.283 If his assessment is accurate, then groups, such as civil
rights advocates, who traditionally relied upon equal protection
arguments to achieve substantive gains need to find alternative
279. See Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges Statement on Board
Responsibility and Institutional Governance, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK,
https://www.suny.edu/media/suny/content-assets/documents/boardoftrustees/BOT-AGBgovernance.pdf. See also Public Trustees, OHIO HIGHER ED, https://www.ohiohighered.org/
trustees (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).
280. Brief for Respondents Bd. of Governors of Wayne State Univ. and Irvin Reid at 9,
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (No. 12-682).
281. The background on how Proposal 2 came into being, as discussed in Part I of this Article,
reveals that the initiative process worked against the clearly expressed interests of various racial
minorities in maintaining race-conscious policies. See supra Part I. In contrast, the success of racial
minorities in securing the inclusion of such policies within the decisionmaking of university
admissions boards suggests their voices were heard. See supra Part I.
282. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 781–83 (2011).
283. Id.
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approaches to accomplish their objectives. As a way of compensating
for the paradigm shift in thinking, Yoshino argues that the “libertybased dignity claim” may be a way to respond to the Court’s rejection
of disparate impact claims.284 By moving the claim to what he describes
as a “high enough level of generality” those who are not advancing it
can nonetheless relate to it and envision themselves in terms of it.285
But Yoshino’s proposition should include an important caveat. If
the claim is too general, it will not fully explain the problem and
account for why the claim is being made in the first instance. Yoshino
maintains that the liberty-based dignity claim is likely to garner
widespread support and to be accepted by the Court.286 Under his
approach, this type of claim should be brought rather than one, for
example, asserting that Proposal 2 constitutes direct discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Yoshino equates this “high
level of generality” with universal human rights. 287 He predicts that the
Court’s current analytical framework for addressing equal protection
claims brought by minorities is likely to result in their failure. The
Court’s posture towards arguments asserted by racial minorities in
support of affirmative action bears out his thesis. Yoshino writes:
[S]tate action that seeks to help historically disadvantaged groups –
“affirmative action” programs – are the governmental programs
most likely to remain facially discriminatory. . . . In contrast, state
action that perpetuates the subordination of historically
disadvantaged groups will tend to express itself in facially neutral
terms. . . . For this reason equal protection jurisprudence that turns
formalistically on facial discrimination will, from an
antisubordination perspective, get it exactly backward. On the one
hand, this jurisprudence invalidates affirmative action programs
seeking to aid historically subordinated groups. . . . On the other
hand, it upholds second-generation discrimination that continues to
subordinate groups.288

If one takes Yoshino’s arguments to heart and attempts to make
inroads relying upon liberties arguments, it is not clear that they would
fare any better. BAMN already tried this strategy, albeit at the district
court level, and it did not work.289 Drawing from cases like Grutter,
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 767–68.
The failure of this approach in Schuette is not a reason to abandon it. Rather, the goal
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which contained aspects of the argument that universities have the
freedom to make decisions about whom to admit and the substance of
their curricula,290 BAMN argued that as “beneficiaries” of university
policies that took into account diversity, Proposal 2 infringed upon their
First Amendment right to academic freedom.291 The district court
rejected this argument, concluding that BAMN lacked standing in that
the First Amendment right belonged to the universities rather than to
them.292
The challenge to properly frame a cognizable liberty-style
argument is evident. If courts are resistant to recognizing BAMN’s
interests and the impact of a restrictive initiative, like Proposal 2, on the
lived experiences of those represented, then regardless of how the
argument is framed, courts will not act in a protective manner.293 While
the academic freedom argument was persuasive in Grutter, it is not
clear that even if the universities had been in a position to make this
argument rather than the plaintiffs, that it would have changed the
outcome of the case at the district court level or ultimately at the
Supreme Court level.294 In fact, in a later moment in the litigation it is
interesting that the Schuette Court articulated a liberty-based argument
not in support of BAMN but rather as a rationale for its holding that
the Court lacked the power to prohibit Michigan voters from deciding
the question of the constitutional validity of race-conscious
admissions.295 The question then for civil rights activists who seek to
here is to underscore the difficulty in framing substitute civil rights arguments that will protect
racial minority interests in being able to fully participate and contribute to society.
290. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d
924, 934–35, 942–43 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
291. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 935.
292. Id. at 943 (“[T]he Coalition plaintiffs do not have a personal right to a diverse student
body grounded in the First Amendment.”)
293. Reva Siegel persuasively argues that in the desegregation period, the United States
Supreme Court has privileged the experience of “majority groups” protecting them “from actions
of representative government that promote minority opportunities” while simultaneously
disregarding the experiences “discrete and insular” racial minorities. Siegel, supra note 13, at 7.
294. It is important to note that the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and
Wayne State University were actually named as defendants in the case. They sought to be
dismissed but the court refused their request concluding that they were “properly joined as
parties.” See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
295. Justice Kennedy reasoned:
The respondents in this case insist that a difficult question of public policy must be taken
from the reach of the voters, and thus removed from the realm of public discussion,
dialogue, and debate in an election campaign. Quite in addition to the serious First
Amendment implications of that position with respect to any particular election, it is
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have the promise of the reconstruction amendments fulfilled and to see
the fruition of the work of their campaigns is: Can they repackage their
objectives as liberty-based arguments? The challenge is a daunting one.
CONCLUSION
There are long-term implications to the Schuette decision that
extend beyond the realm of education. The success of voter initiatives
such as Proposal 2 result in unequal political processes that give a
permanency to majoritarian political advantages. Ballot initiatives
distort the democratic process and undermine equality principles. For
these reasons, severe restrictions should be placed on them where they
seek to override fundamental equal protection and voting rights
constitutional guarantees involving racial minorities. It is critically
important for courts to intervene in the wake of disabling majoritarian
political action in order to achieve the “representation reinforcing
approach to judicial review”296 that functions to facilitate the effective
participation and representation of racial minorities in the political
process. Finally, the political process doctrine should be available to
racial minorities who seek to protect their right to fully participate in
democracy and influence the decisions that impact them.

inconsistent with the underlying premises of a responsible, functioning democracy.
See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014) (emphasis
added). Kennedy later writes, “First Amendment dynamics would be disserved if this Court were
to say that the question here at issue is beyond the capacity of the voters to debate and then to
determine.” Id.
296. ELY, supra note 6, at 87.

